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Preface
In the rst chapter, I explore the e¤ect of intellectual property rights (IPRs) on the
composition of international trade. Conventional wisdom and theory have it that developing
countriesIPRs incentives di¤er substantially from those of developed countries, especially
under technology imitation. The model I develop here explores a new channel by which
IPRs may a¤ect welfare such that cross-country incentives are aligned even in the short
run: the composition of trade. I investigate whether and how IPRs and the threat of
imitation may a¤ect trade of di¤erentiated products asymmetrically. Allowing for di¤ering
consumer preferences across products implies unique markups and demand elasticities for all
di¤erentiated goods. Because products are associated with di¤erent prot potential, rms
make asymmetric export decisions when faced with the threat of imitation and its spillover
e¤ects into the home market. Cross-country incentives can be aligned as product imitators
trade o¤ gains from lower prices with losses due to less access to inelastically demanded
varieties. The primary predictions of the model nd empirical support in the data, where it
is shown that a greater proportion of inelastically demanded goods are exported to stronger
relative to weaker IPR destinations.
In the second chapter, joint work with William F. Lincoln (Johns Hopkins University),
we ask the question: how do intellectual property rights (IPR) policies a¤ect international
trade? We consider two of the central results from the model presented in Chapter I: (i) that
IPR reforms should expand the range of goods exported to a country through the extensive
margin of trade and (ii) rms with more newly developed products should be more sensitive
to IPR policies than other innovative rms. Building the rst comprehensive matched rm-
level data set on destination-specic exports and patents, we begin by documenting a number
of facts on the relationship between trade and innovation. We then document a signicant
positive relationship between whether or not a rm has a patent and its sensitivity to IPR
policies in terms of its exports. Firms with more newly developed patents show a larger
sensitivity than other rms.
Finally, in the third chapter, joint work with Yibin Mu (International Monetary Fund), I
analyze nancial development in Sub-Saharan Africa. The nancial sectors of Middle-Income
iv
Countries (MICs) in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) continue to evolve. Under this backdrop,
this chapter investigates two questions: (1) how does nancial inclusion compare to a group
of emerging economies and (2) how does nancial inclusion impact nancial stability? Our
ndings suggest the following: (i) access to nance for individuals in SSA is comparable to
EMs while access to nance for SMEs lags behind EMs; (ii) SME access to nance and/or
savings-oriented nancial inclusion enhances nancial stability while nancial inclusion fo-
cusing on credit to individuals undermines nancial stability; and (iii) a more equity and
deposit based funding structure enhances nancial stability.
v
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Chapter 1
Trade of Di¤erentiated Products
Under Intellectual Property Imitation
1.1 Introduction
The traditional discussion around intellectual property right (IPR) protection centers
on the time-inconsistency problem of conicting short-run price versus long-run innovation
incentives. A similar trade-o¤ exists between developed nations, the source of most tech-
nological innovation, and developing nations who seek greater accessibility of innovative
products. Developing nations have often relied on varying degrees of product imitation as a
de facto economic development strategy in a bid to catch-upto advanced economies. It
is common to assume incentive misalignments between developed nations seeking stronger
IPRs versus developing nations which seek lower protection1, as highlighted by the discussion
surrounding the WTO Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) agreement.
How is the composition of trade a¤ected by IPRs? Can a country with weak IPRs ever
lose in the short run from technology imitation? It is to these questions that this paper is
addressed.
In the new trade theory with increasing returns to scale, product variety has important
implications for the gains from trade. In these models, welfare gains stem from increasing
access to the number of product varieties, founded upon consumerstaste for variety. Yet,
the varieties each contribute equally to consumer welfare under the standard CES utility
assumption and there is no di¤erential weight due to the type of variety itself. Faced with
potential shocks to prot, such as those due to intellectual property (IP) pilferage, rms
of comparable productivity should adjust in the same way given CES preferences between
1Grossman and Lai (2004) demonstrate this misalignment theoretically in a game-theoretic framework.
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varieties. A fundamental question, then, is whether it is indeed the case that shocks such
as the threat of IP piracy a¤ect rm exports of di¤erent varieties in the same way. In this
paper, I explore this question both theoretically and empirically.
I develop a North-South theoretical framework of rm export choice under IP piracy
when consumer preferences di¤er across varieties. To fully incorporate the idea of individuals
having di¤ering tastes over a spectrum of varieties, I drop the oft-used CES utility function
in favor of a quasi-linear utility with varying preference parameters for each variety. The
distinct preference parameters translate into goods associated with unique markups and
own-price demand elasticities. The Northern rm export decision is fully endogenized as
a trade-o¤ between gains from a larger consumer market and losses from potential piracy
of its technology by Southern rms. The model hinges on the fact that rm prots are
higher for more inelastically demanded goods. Thus, when faced with the threat of product
piracy with spillover e¤ects into the home market, rms producing relatively inelastically
demanded goods stand to sustain greater prot losses and are more sensitive to destination
market IPRs. This leads to systematically di¤erent rm export decisions across products.
An important insight the model delivers is that exports of varieties can di¤er in the extent
to which they are a¤ected by destination IPRs. Exports of relatively homogeneous, highly
demand elastic goods are entirely una¤ected by the presence of IP piracy. This is because
Southern rms either already have the technology to produce the most homogeneous variety
or imitation is not protable. If a variety is highly demand inelastic, however, rm prots for
that good are higher and the threat of technological imitation can be a binding constraint
for exports. In the model, accessing the South via exports leads to a greater risk of IP
piracy, which cuts into prots both at home and abroad. However, this is o¤set by potential
prots gains from selling in the South, which is proportional to the population share of the
South. In equilibrium, if the share of the Souths population is greater than the increased
probability of piracy, then trade is not a¤ected and rms will choose to export as gains from
accessing a larger market more than o¤sets expected losses from piracy.
While there exist several important papers in the theoretical literature on trade with
technological imitation, this paper is most closely related to Connolly and Valderrama (2005),
which showed that technological spillovers in a model with intermediate goods and imitation
can result in properly designed Southern IPR regimes that are welfare-enhancing for both the
developed North and the developing South. The primary departures I make from the existing
literature are: use of preferences allowing for di¤ering demand elasticities across goods, the
presence of explicit rm prot shocks stemming from technological imitation and a focus on
short-run impacts rather than the traditional long-term feedback e¤ects on innovation. In
this sense, the model can o¤er short-run incentive compatibility for both trading partners and
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can exibly generate positive or negative net gains from trade dependent upon destination
country size and IPR regime.
The predictions of the theoretical model nd strong empirical support. Using country-
product-level world bilateral trade data, I document several new empirical regularities that
are consistent with the theoretical framework. In the data, there is greater trade of relatively
inelastically demanded products to strong compared to weak IP protection destinations. I
nd this to be the case both cross-sectionally across countries with di¤ering levels of IPRs
and across time for the same country following a number of well-documented IP reforms.
This nding also holds under various specications and sensible subsample checks. This
suggests not only that trade of varieties is di¤erentially impacted by the threat of IP piracy,
but that di¤ering consumer preferences across these varieties may generate an additional
channel through which trade under IP piracy a¤ects welfare, beyond the standard number
of varieties e¤ect.
In the empirical section, I evaluate the e¤ect of IPRs on the composition of import vari-
eties in several ways. First, I take a cross-sectional di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach utilizing
Park (2008) indices on IPR strength across countries. I use Broda-Weinstein country-specic
estimated demand elasticities (s) at the HS 3-digit level as a measure of product di¤erenti-
ation. Combining these, I estimate the e¤ect of the interaction between product elasticities
and IPRs, controlling for product and bilateral country xed e¤ects. I also run a num-
ber of robustness checks, detailed in the empirical section. Results across all specications
signicantly point to the fact that more inelastically demanded goods are more likely to
be exported to a destination with stronger IPRs. The magnitudes range from a .447% to
3.2% higher import value of inelastically demanded goods for every one standard deviation
decrease in elasticity between countries with the strongest versus weakest IPRs.
I also estimate a panel di¤erence-in-di¤erence model for 6 individual countries well-
documented as having had IPR reforms (Branstetter et. al 2006): Argentina, Brazil, China,
Colombia, Turkey and Venezuela. I use destination-specic product demand elasticities in-
teracted with a binary reform variable to look at the trade impact on di¤erent varieties from
the reform for each country individually. I then pool together data from all 6 reforms and
rerun the estimation. I nd that the signs of the coe¢ cients are broadly consistent with the
cross-sectional evidence, but that this e¤ect is only signicant in the pooled-sample. The
coe¢ cient signs suggest, altogether, that relatively inelastically demanded goods are more
likely to be exported to a destination following an IP reform.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I set up the baseline theoretical model
and highlight some important features of the model. Section 3 explores the closed economy
solution and includes some comparative statics. Section 4 explores the open economy solution
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with corresponding welfare analysis and comparative statics for both countries. In Section
5, I extend the baseline model to incorporate endogenous IP piracy and incomplete re-
exportation. Section 6 presents empirical evidence. Section 7 concludes.
1.2 A Model of Firm Exports and Trade under IP
Piracy
I develop a short-run model of rm export choice under intellectual property imitation.
Despite lack of direct exploration of the e¤ect on exports of potential IP piracy, the existing
New Trade Theory literature, based almost exclusively on CES consumer preferences, does
have something to say about this issue. If the risk of IP piracy were to become non-zero, the
standard Melitz model based on CES preferences with its constant markup would see the
overall number of varieties traded decrease. But this decrease would be symmetric across
all varieties, given the same level of rm productivity, and there would be no reason to
expect products of di¤erent varieties (much less di¤erent elasticities, since all elasticities are
the same) to be impacted di¤erentially in the face of varying IPR levels or following an IP
reform. As a result, any welfare consequences would be dependent only upon the number of
varieties (as di¤erentiated based on rm productivity, not preferences) and not the type of
varieties consumers prefer.
In this model, I abstract from rm productivity di¤erences except for those that are
cross-country and between homogeneous and di¤erentiated varieties. Instead, I focus on
di¤erences in consumer preferences over types of varieties and explore whether and how
this dimension generates varietal di¤erences in rm export choice under the threat of IP
pilferage. Di¤erences in rm export choice across varieties can stem from di¤ering prots
across products due to the varying demand elasticities of the products. Welfare impacts
under this framework are then considered for both parties to trade.
1.2.1 Model Setup
There are 2 types of countries in this model: the high-wage developed (North) and
the low-wage developing (South) countries. Labor is the only factor of production with
labor productivity di¤ering in the two countries, while the labor force in both countries is
assumed to be xed and exogenous at LN and LS, respectively. The North has the unique
ability to produce di¤erentiated goods from its exclusive innovative ability, while South is
unable to develop new goods. The homogeneous goods is tradable and its technology is
common property, so that it can be produced in either North or South, though with di¤ering
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productivity, as discussed later. I assume that the market for the homogeneous good is
characterized by perfect competition in both countries.
Let J be the total number of "new" goods currently produced that are still under an active
patent. Over time, the set of J changes via a law of motion governed by both Northern
innovation and IPR protection, but I abstract from dynamic considerations and focus on
short-run e¤ects under a xed J . Within this framework, we can interpret the products
either as di¤erent goods altogether or simply as di¤erent varieties of the same good. To
keep in line with the data in the empirical section, I choose the former interpretation in this
treatment; however the latter interpretation holds equal merit within this framework.
1.2.2 Consumer Optimization
Let there be a continuum of new goods varieties j 2 [1; J ]. Each economy has measure 1
number of consumers. Each variety is associated with a distinct preference parameter j > 1,
with j 2 (1;1), which will imply di¤ering own-price elasticities of demand for each good
type. Intuitively, this can be thought of as the existence of many assortments of a good, with
each di¤ering in its own-price demand elasticity. In this formulation, as I show below, higher
values of j always correspond to goods associated with relatively inelastic demands, which
can be interpreted as "newer" goods. Without loss of generality, I will also assume that j
is monotone increasing in j, that is, goods j are ordered by decreasing demand elasticity.
Homogeneous consumers share the same quasilinear instantaneous utility function2. Good
0 is the homogeneous numeraire. Consumers in both countries have similar preferences and
solve the instantaneous maximization problem
maxu = q0 +
Z J
1
jqj
1
j dj
s.t. I = p0q0 +
Z J
1
pjqjdj
Setting p0 to unity, as the numeraire, the solution is given by
qj = p
j
1 j
j
q0 = I  
Z J
1
p
1
1 j
j dj
2The usage of quasilinear preferences has precedence set in the literature including Dixit and Norman
(1980), Grossman and Helpman (1994), Ottaviano et al. (2002, quadratic quasi-linear), Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008, quadratic quasi-linear) and Dinolopoulos (2011). Other specications allowing for di¤ering demand
elasticities across goods would likely yield similar results, but in this paper I employ the simplest possible
utility function with this feature.
5
with each good js corresponding own-price elasticity of demand given by
Dpj =
j
1  j ; j > 1
This implies that varieties corresponding to higher values of j have demand that is relatively
more inelastic. Higher j in this utility function represents varieties of relatively lower
elasticity.
1.2.3 Firm Optimization
The North
Due to the presence of intellectual property right patents, each variety will have only one
monopolistic rm producing it. The Northern rm specializing in production of a variety
will thus also be indexed by j, with J total rms. Production in each industry is a simple
linear function of labor alone. I assume that production for the rm associated with each
variety has a unit labor requirement of 1, thus the production function can be represented
by qj = lj, where lj is labor input into making that variety of the good. Let us also assume
that production of the homogeneous good is linear in the North qN0 = l
N
0 . Let q
N
j be the
per-consumer demand faced by the Northern rm for its product, pNj the price it sets for its
product and lNj its choice of labor input. Firms for each industry enjoy monopoly prots
and face the following closed economy optimization problem, with wN denoting wages in the
North:
Nj = p
N
j q
N
j   wN lNj
Because all consumer preferences are symmetric, the per-consumer rm prot maximizing
conditions in the North are therefore:
pNj = wNj
) qj = p
j
1 j
j = (wNj)
j
1 j
q0 = I  
Z J
1
(wNj)
1
1 j dj
In equilibrium, if the homogeneous good 0 is produced and all production is linear in
labor input, then p0 = wN and wages in the North should be unity as well. This implies that
prices and per-consumer quantities can be expressed as functions of the preference parameter
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j:
pNj = j
qj = 
j
1 j
j
q0 = I  
Z J
1

1
1 j
j dj
The South
For simplicity, I will assume that rms in the South cannot develop new products and
are only capable of either producing the homogeneous good or imitating Northern products.
I show that there will exist a ^j, below which represents the goods exported by the North to
the South and above which represents the goods that remain unexported by North. Let nS
denote the set of products both exported to and imitated by South and let nN denote the
set of goods produced and exported by North and not imitated by South.
In order to match the intuition of the South representing developing countries, I as-
sume that wS < 1 = wN . This relative wage condition holds by assuming that Southern
productivity of the non-traded homogeneous good is lower than its Northern counterpart
(i.e. qS0 = 
S
0 l
S
0 where the productivity 
S
0 < 1); otherwise only South would produce the
homogeneous good. For the j 2 nS products imitated by South, I assume the imitation
was complete and a Southern rm can imitate the good with the same productivity of the
originating Northern rm (i.e. qSj = l
S
j 8 j 2 nS). This assumption can be easily relaxed
and all results would qualitatively go through.
IPRs can be represented by a per-unit expected ne, , of pirating a Northern product,
with higher expected nes associated with stronger IPRs. The per-unit nature of the ne is
in line with actual IPR enforcement practices. Expected nes are redistributed back, lump-
sum, to North and enters in Northern aggregate welfare. Given that any rm in the South
can choose to imitate an imported Northern product, and assuming the homogeneous good
is still produced in the South, the market for each imitated variety is perfectly competitive
and thus, in the absense of IPR protection, prices in South should equal marginal cost and
satisfy pSj = wS 8 j 2 nS. For the unimitated goods j 2 nN , prices remain at monopoly
prices pSj = p
N
j = j. Since the presence of imitation can cause Northern rms to choose
not to export certain products to South, I distinguish the total set of products available in
the South, i.e. exported by North or produced by South, by denoting this JS  J , with
nS  JS.
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The labor market clearing condition in South is given by
LS =
qS0
S0
+
R
j2nS
qSj dj
where qSj =
 
pSj
 j
1 j and qS0 = wSLS 
R JS
1
pSj
 
pSj
 j
1 j dj, with j 2 JS. Since wN was pinned
down at unity, then if we restrict attention to the case in which the homogeneous good is
produced in South in equilibrium, the Southern wage can be determined directly solving the
market clearing condition above. In this case, wS = S0wN = 
S
0 .
Timing
Being a static model, the timing of all rm actions happens over a short span in a series
of sequential steps. First each Northern rm develops and produces the prot-maximizing
quantity of its product for the Northern consumers and observes the probability of being
pirated in South. The Northern rm then decides whether or not to export to South. If
export occurs, then there is an immediate probability  of being pirated by a Southern rm
and being forced into Southern perfectly competitive prots, although due to productivity
di¤erences this is still above marginal cost for the Northern rm. If its product is pirated,
then if the competitive prots are su¢ cient (which occurs if the technology gap between
North and South is very large), a Northern rm will undercut the Souther competitive price
by ", recapturing the market; otherwise the rm will simply exit the market.
1.3 Closed Economy Solution
To begin with, it is helpful to analyze the economic environment in North in autarky.
Solving the closed economy equilibirum for North requires budget balance and labor market
clearing conditions.
1.3.1 Price Index
The ideal price index in the North (derivation in Mathematical Appendix) is given by
P = p0  
Z J
1
p
j
j 1
0 jp
1
1 j
j dj +
R J
1
p
j
j 1
0 pj
1
1 j dj
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Plugging in the monopoly price pNj = j and normalizing the price of the homogeneous good
p0 = 1, we have
P = 1 
Z J
1
j
2 j
1 j dj +
R J
1
j
1
1 j dj
1.3.2 Budget Balance
I will assume that at a given point in time the number of goods/industries J is xed
and there is no free entry. This makes intuitive sense due to the presence of patents; once a
good is invented, patents prevent other rms from producing that particular variety of good.
Noting that price normalization for the homogeneous good implies zero prots for that good,
let total rm prots per-capita in North at date t be represented by
N (t)
LN
=
R J
1

pNj q
N
j   wNqNj

dj
=
R J
1
"

1
1 j
j   
j
1 j
j
#
dj
Since total income, , equals the sum of labor income and monopoly rents,  = wNLN +
N = LN + N . Individual income, I, then can be expressed as I = LN , assuming perfect
income equality.
Then budget balance in the North implies that total expenditure, EN , equals total income
and satises:
EN = LN +N = LN + LN
R J
1
"

1
1 j
j   
j
1 j
j
#
dj = 
It is important to note here that consumption of the homogeneous good will always be
positive as long as 1 >
R J
1

j
1 j
j dj. This places no additional restrictions on j or J .
1.3.3 Market Clearing
In equilibirum, labor supply in North will equal labor demand, the labor required to pro-
duce the equilibrium quantity demanded for each Northern good produced. Since Northern
production technology is linear for both the di¤erentiated and homogeneous products and
the measure of consumers is unity, with all consumers having symmetric preferences, labor
market clearing can be expressed as:
LN = I  
Z J
1

1
1 j
j dj +
Z J
1

j
1 j
j dj
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This condition, however, is redundant and follows from the budget balance condition
due to the fact that the form of utility function implies innitely elastic labor demand
for the homogeneous good. As such, if positive quantities of the homogeneous good are
produced, then the wage rate is immediately pinned down and the market clearing condition
automatically follows from the goods market clearing condition.
1.3.4 Welfare
Real wages in the North can be represented by
w
P
=
1
1  R J
1
j
2 j
1 j dj +
R J
1
j
1
1 j dj
Welfare can be expressed as real wages plus real prots per worker and is given by
W  w
P
+
N
LN
P
=
1 +
R J
1
"

1
1 j
j   
j
1 j
j
#
dj
1  R J
1
j
2 j
1 j dj +
R J
1
j
1
1 j dj
1.3.5 Comparative Statics
Looking at the evolution of welfare as the number of products J grows, we can see that
the real wage increases in the number of varieties. This result is consistent with new products
entering positively into the utility function.
Claim 1 P is decreasing in J and w
P
is increasing in J
Proof.
2  J
1  J ln J >
1
1  J ln J , 8 J > 1
=) 
2 J
1 J
J > 
1
1 J
J , 8 J > 1
) @P
@J
=  
2 J
1 J
J + 
1
1 J
J < 0
) @
w
P
@J
> 0, 8 j > 1
Looking at how monopoly rents, and thus monopoly rents per worker, are a¤ected by the
number of varieties, we have the following claim
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Claim 2 N
LN
is increasing in J (t)
Proof.
N
LN
=
R J
1
"

1
1 j
j   
j
1 j
j
#
dj
1
1  J ln J >
J
1  J ln J , 8 J > 1
) 
1
1 J
J > 
J
1 J
J , 8 J > 1
) @N
@J
= 
1
1 J
J   
J
1 J
J > 0
) @
N
LN
@J
> 0, 8 j > 1
Altogether, this implies that aggregate welfare rises as the number of varieties increases,
that is, @W
@J
> 0.
Looking at how monopoly rents per worker for a particular rm j, Nj = 
1
1 j
j   
j
1 j
j ,
are a¤ected by the elasticity, I make the following claim
Claim 3 N rises with j, 8 j > 1
Proof.
@Nj
@j
=
264

1
j(1 j) +
1
(1 j)2 ln j


1
1 j
j
 

1
1 j +
1
(1 j)2 ln j


j
1 j
j
375 > 0, 8 j > 1
1.4 Open Economy Solution
The framework under an open economy is the main one of interest in later analyzing the
empirical evidence. All the rm-level properties explored in the previous section, under a
closed economy, follow here with some minor modications.
1.4.1 Prots
Let qNj and q
S
j be the per consumer demand faced in North and South respectively for
product j. Under monopoly, pMj = j and q
M
j = 
j
1 j
j . Let 
M
j =
 
pMj   wN

qMj =
11
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Figure 1.1: Response of rm-level monopoly prots to increases in 
(j   1) 
j
1 j
j denote Northern rm level prots per consumer, under monopoly. A Northern
rm that chooses not to export its product earns the autarky total prot Mj = 
M
j LN . A
Northern rm that exports its product to South and whose product is not imitated faces
the same monopoly price and quantity as under autarky and earns the global prots Nj =
Mj (LN + LS).
Southern rms face a per-unit expected ne  of pirating a Northern product. A Southern
rm who chooses to imitate a specic Northern rms product earns expected prot of zero
due to perfect competition in the South. Its expected total prot can be expressed as
E
 
Sj

=
 
pSj   wS   
 
qNj LN + q
S
j LS

. Therefore under perfect competition, the price of
product j in South will simply equal the marginal cost pSj = p
S = wS +  and expected
prots will be zero for all imitated varieties j 2 nS. Southern rms will repeat the game
every period and can opt to imitate again even if they were caught previously.
I make the assumption that, if imitated, Northern rms face some spillover e¤ects
in the home market. That is, when its product is imitated, a Northern rm not only
faces competitive prices in the Southern market, but also sees some of its existing do-
mestic market base subject to competitive prices as well, with a¤ected prices and quan-
tities given by pS = wS +  and qCj = (wS + )
j
1 j . Let ! 2 [0; 1] denote the pro-
portion of Northern consumers that can procure any pirated good j. The case in which
! = 0, then, corresponds to no access to imitated goods by Northern consumers, while
12
! = 1 corresponds to full access to pirated products; throughout this analysis, I assume
! > 0. Prots for a Northern rm when its product is imitated will be given by Cj = 
pMj   wN

qMj (1  !)LN + max

pCj   wN ; 0
	
qCj (!LN + LS). Thus as long as ! < 1 or if
the expected ne is big enough on IPR infringement by the South, North can still obtain
positive prots even under the presence of piracy.
1.4.2 The North
When the countries open up to trade, each Northern rm must decide whether or not
to export its product to South. If a rm exports, it faces an increased probability of its
technology being pirated relative to selling purely domestically. This piracy probability
di¤erential is given by  = f
 
Nj ; 

, where f1 < 0, f2 < 0. Whenever technology is pirated,
the rm associated with that variety is forced into a Bertrand game of perfect competition
with all Southern imitators of its product. Let D be the prot of a Northern rm from
selling only to the domestic market and let X be the expected prot of a Northern rm
from exporting to South and also selling domestically.
D =
 
pMj   wN

qMj LN
X =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 
pMj   wN

qMj (LN + LS)
if pMj  pS
(1  )  pMj   wN qMj (LN + LS) + 
"  
pMj   wN

qMj (1  !)LN
+max

pCj   wN ; 0
	
qCj (!LN + LS)
#
if pMj > p
S
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
Since pS is constant for all j, instances may occur when pMj  pS (i.e. j  wS + ). In
this case, the Northern monopolist knows it can always undercut the price of any potential
Southern imitator and secure the entire Southern market. Thus it does not fear being
imitated and will always choose to export to gain access to a larger market. This translates
mathematically into the piece-wise nature of the X function above.
Nj = max

D; X
	
N =
R J(t)
1
Nj dj
Let us dene   X   D as the export premium to a Northern rm from exporting
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compared to selling only to its domestic market
 =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 
 
pMj   wN

qMj LS
if pMj  pS
2 
h 
pMj   wN

qMj

LS
!LN+LS
  

+  maxpS   wN ; 0	 qCj i (!LN + LS)
if pMj > p
S
9>>>>=>>>>;
=
8>>>><>>>>:
(j   1) 
j
1 j
j LS if j  wS + 264 (j   1) 
j
1 j
j
h
LS
!LN+LS
  
i
+ max fwS +   1; 0g (wS + )
j
1 j
375 (!LN + LS) if j > wS + 
9>>>>=>>>>;
Since pCj = p
S = wS +  and wS < wN = 1, it is possible that pS < wN , causing
max fwS +   1; 0g = 0. This would cause the export premium to be entirely governed by
(j   1) 
j
1 j
j
h
LS
!LN+LS
  
i
for all j > wS +  (i.e. pMj > p
S). Thus I make the following
claim
Claim 4 If pS < wN , then whenever LS!LN+LS  , all goods will be exported by North and
whenever LS
!LN+LS
< , only products corresponding to j  wS +  will be exported.
Proof. If pS < wN , then Cj = 0 for all goods with j > wS + , and thus the sign of the
export premium is completely governed by the rst term (j   1) 
j
1 j
j
h
LS
!LN+LS
  
i
, i.e. by
whether LS
!LN+LS
R . When LS
!LN+LS
  then the export premium is positive for all goods
in the domain. When LS
!LN+LS
<  then the export premium is only positive for goods with
monopoly prices below the Southern marginal cost of production j  wS + .
Henceforth, I restrict attention to the case when pCj = p
S > wN , both because it is
the more interesting case and because the alternative case only provides an all-or-nothing
criterion for product exports as we see from Claim 5. Thus the export premium can be
simplied to
 =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1  (j   1) 
j
1 j
j LS
if j  wS + 
2 
"
(j   1) 
j
1 j
j
h
LS
!LN+LS
  
i
+  (wS +   1) (wS + )
j
1 j
#
(LN + LS)
if j > wS + 
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
Proposition 5 If Souths share of world population is larger than the probability of imita-
tion, all di¤erentiated varieties in existence J will be exported for any level of IPR protection
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Proof. Only if  is positive will a given Northern rm choose to export its product to the
South and risk its technology being pirated. The expression above is positive for all values of
j > 1 as long as LS!LN+LS > . So when Souths share of world population is su¢ ciently large,
that is, larger than the probability of Southern rms imitating its technology, all Northern
rms have an incentive to export their varieties and all varieties J will be exported. This is
entirely independent of the level of IPR protection as measured by .
Figure 1.2. Graphs of  when LS
!LN+LS
> 
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The graphs in Figure 1.2 highlight that all goods are traded whenever LS
!LN+LS
> .
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Note the result that this is independent of IPR protection goes away if we assume that IPR
protection also impacts . However, when Souths share of world population is su¢ ciently
low or when the probability of imitation is su¢ ciently high, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 6 When the population share of South is lower than the probability of piracy,
LS
!LN+LS
< , if there exists any Northern rm choosing to export (i.e. wS +  > wN), then
for any  and LS
!LN+LS
where the relative marginal gain under piracy is lower than the piracy
probability, (wS + ) LS!LN+LS < , there exists a unique cuto¤ ^j such that for all j 2 (1; ^j]
Northern rms corresponding to those varieties will choose to export their product to South,
while for all j 2 (^j;1) Northern rms will not export their product to South. Thus, there
exists a convex subset, JS; of the total product set, J , which is exported by North to South.
Proof. In Appendix.
In Figure 1.3 below, panels (c), (e), (g) and (h) display graphs of the export premium
when the necessary conditions of Proposition 2 are not satised; thus they are examples of
when North exports all products in existence, J , as is seen by the positive export premium
over the entire range of j. The other graphs in Figure 3 highlight various cuto¤ values, ^j,
under di¤erent parameter specications.
Figure 1.3. Graphs of  when LS
!LN+LS
<  and wS +  > wN
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Proposition 7 A higher level of IPR protection, , in the South, is characterized by both
(1) a greater absolute number of available goods, JS (t) (characterized by  > 0) and (2) the
availabiity of more inelastically demanded (higher j) goods
Proof.
@
@
=  (!LN + LS)

(wS + )
j
1 j + (wS +   1) (wS + )
2j 1
1 j

> 0
As the critical ^j is unique, increasing  will only shift  to the right, leading to a higher
critical ^j. Thus all lower j goods exported previously will still be exported, but the set
will simply expand to include higher j products.
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Figure 1.4. The e¤ect on  of an increase in 
Proposition 8 A higher piracy rate  in the South, is characterized by both (1) a lower
absolute number of available goods and (2) the loss in availability of more inelastically de-
manded (higher j) goods
Proof. Still assuming that wS+  min fjg ) (j   1) 
j
1 j
j >

wS
S1
+   1

(wS + )
j
1 j
and thus
 =
(
(j   1) 
j
1 j
j

LS
!LN + LS
  

+   (wS +   1) (wS + )
j
1 j
)
(!LN + LS)
@
@
= (!LN + LS)
"
(wS +   1) (wS + )
j
1 j   (j   1) 
j
1 j
j
#
< 0
Propositions 3 and 4, plus the fact that a higher j corresponds to more inelastic demand,
together allow us to conclude that, within the framework of di¤erentiated varieties, Southern
consumers sustain welfare losses due to piracy and low IPR protection both in terms of the
absolute number of goods as well as the type of good, based on its demand elasticity.
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1.4.3 The South
Restricting attention again to the case in which the homogeneous good is produced in
South in equilibrium, we know that wS = S0 and p0 = pS = wS +  = 
S
0 +  where 
S
0 < 1
is the productivity parameter for Souths production of the homogeneous good. Thus, for,
nS, the set of goods exported by North and imitated by South, pS = wS + , while for
the set of goods exported by North but not imitated by South, nN , the monopoly price
still prevails pM = j. Recall that together these two sets comprise the total set of goods
available in the South, that is, exported by North: nN + nS = JS  fj :   0g. Thus the
cuto¤ ^j =

j : j = max

JS
		
.
Then the ideal price index in the South can be represented by the solution to the expen-
diture minimization problem
min p0q0 +
Z JS
1
pjqjdj = p0q0 +
Z
j2nN
pjqjdj +
Z
j2nS
pjqjdj
s.t. u = q0 +
Z JS
1
jqj
1
j dj = 1
20
with the associated rst order condition
qj =

pj
p0
 j
1 j
) q0 = 1 
Z JS
1
j

pj
p0
 1
1 j
dj
Thus the price index in South is given by
PS = p0  
Z JS
1
jp
j
j 1
0 p
1
1 j
j dj +
R JS
1
p
j
j 1
0 pj
1
1 j dj
= p0  
Z
j2nN
jp
j
j 1
0 p
1
1 j
j dj  
Z
j2nS
jp
j
j 1
0 p
1
1 j
j dj +
Z
j2nN
p
j
j 1
0 pj
1
1 j dj
+
Z
j2nS
p
j
j 1
0 pj
1
1 j dj
where the second equality breaks the price index into components depending on whether
the good was pirated (j 2 nS) or not (j 2 nN). Note that for unpirated products j 2 nN ,
monopoly prices pj = j remain in place, while for pirated products j 2 nS, Southern
competitive prices prevail, pSj = 
S
0 + . Plugging back in these di¤erentiated goods prices,
as well as the Southern competitive price for the homogeneous good p0 = pSj = 
S
0 +  (full
derivation in Mathematical Appendix) we have
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1.4.4 Welfare Analysis
The South
Together, Claim 2 and Theorem 2 imply that, when IPR protection is lower, Southern
consumers are strictly worse o¤ in terms of both the absolute availability of varieties as well
as the availability of varieties they demand more inelastically. This result is contrary to the
previous literature which nds that the South never has an incentive to increase its IPR
protection in the short-run, without invoking dynamic innovation considerations. However,
Southern consumers enjoy a lower price for all goods that remain exported by North and are
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imitated by Southern rms. Thus the presence of piracy is benecial to Southern consumers
along the price margin; some of what was previously producer surplus is then transfered to
consumers. The welfare e¤ect of an increase in IPR on the South is essentially a tradeo¤ of
consumer welfare between the intensive margin of prices of available goods and the extensive
margin of the availability of product varieties.
Since all imitated products transform into perfectly competitive industries, Southern
welfare can be simply dened as real wages and expressed as
WS  wS
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=
S0
1 + nS  
R
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(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R
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Claim 9 An increase in IPR protection, i.e. an increase in , has an ambiguous overall
e¤ect on Southern welfare.
Proof. Given that the probability of piracy, , is exogenous and constant for all values of
j, we know that the strength of IPR protection, , only a¤ects nS and nN directly through
its e¤ect on the set of goods exported to South JS. As established by Propositions 3 and 4,
as IPR protection increases, the set JS expands and thus nS and nN expand also.
@PS
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
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Z
j2nS
jdj

   S0 + 
 
n0S () +
Z
j2n0S()
jdj
!
+
@
@
Z
j2nN
 
S0 + 
 j
j 1 (1  j) 
1
1 j
j dj
The second term    S0 +  n0S () + Rj2n0S() jdj < 0, while the third term, though not
directly calculable since we cannot precisely dene the set nN , is also negative, by the
Leibniz rule. We can see this is true because increasing  causes both nN and
 
S0 + 
 jj 1
j
to grow, while (1  j) 
1
1 j
j < 0 for the entire domain. These both point to the price index
decreasing with greater IPR protection and thus overall welfare increasing with greather
protection. However, the rst term above, 1 + nS  
R
j2nS jdj, is of ambiguous sign. Thus
the overall e¤ect on welfare of an increase in IPR protection is ambiguous and depends on
the particular case under examination which would dene the sets nS and nN .
To see this another way, isolating both sides of the inequality to only include positive
terms, we get that Southern welfare is increasing in IPR strength, i.e. @W
S
@
> 0 or @P
S
@
< 0,
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The opposite is true whenever the inequality above is reversed. The fact that Southern
welfare is potentially non-monotone in IPR protection points to the possible existence of an
optimal level of protection with respect to the South.
The North
This model also allows potential welfare gains for North under lowered IPRs. Because I
assume that products, once imitated by South, can be partially re-exported back to North
at a lower price, Northern consumers can experience welfare gains from higher real wages,
even as Northern rms experience prot margin reductions. In addition, Northern rms also
stand to gain a share of the expected total IP reparations, J , from instances when South
has detected and ned pirates for imitation of their products. Imposing transport costs or
other frictional trade barriers to the re-exportation of imitated products by South does not
a¤ect the existence of this additional mechanism, only the magnitude for particular cases.
Let JN = fj :  < 0g be the set of goods not exported by North. The general form of
the previous closed economy price index in North is reproduced below
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Plugging in the monopoly price pNj = j for goods that are not exported and goods that
are exported and not imitated (JN [ nN), in addition to the Southern competitive price
pSj = 
S
0 +  for goods that are exported and imitated, we have
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 
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Northern per-worker prots, under trade, (more detailed derivation in Mathematical Appen-
dix) are now
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Thus, combining and simplifying the above, welfare in North in an open economy with piracy
can be expressed as
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The welfare e¤ect of an increase in IPR protection in North is a tradeo¤ between sta-
tic consumer and producer welfare and hinges on the assumption that rm prots can be
impacted by piracy through the inltration of pirated products on a rms existing market
base. Increasing IPR protection simultaneously (weakly) raises consumer prices in North
while increasing Northern rm prots.
Claim 10 An increase in IPR protection, i.e. an increase in , has an ambiguous overall
e¤ect on Northern welfare.
Proof. The numerator in the above, which I denote X, is clearly positive. Its derivative
with respect to the nal term in X, the expected value of IP violations nes, is J > 0. The
derivative of the rst four terms of X with respect to  is of uncertain sign; we know that
Mj does not depend on  and 
C
j , nN and nS are all increasing in , thus the third and
fourth terms of X are increasing in , however since JN is decreasing in , so is the second
term in the numerator, thus the overall sign of X is unknown.
The denominator in the above, denoted Y , is negative since both j
1
1 j   
2 j
1 j
j and
(1  j)
 
S0 + 
 1
1 j are negative along the domain. Its derivative with respect to  is
again uncertain since the rst term of Y is increasing with respect to , while the third
term decreases with respect to the parameter. With regard to the limits of integration of
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the second term, since JN decreases relatively more than nN increases as  rises (i.e. the
number of goods not exported falls more than the number of unimitated products grows,
since not all exported goods are imitated), JN [nN decreases in number and the second term
becomes less negative. Since increasing  causes the set to expand, the third term becomes
more negative. The overall e¤ect is ambiguous. Thus we have @W
N
@
= Y @X X@Y
Y 2
R 0. The
e¤ect of a strengthening of Southern IPRs on Northern welfare will have a positive e¤ect if
Y @X   X@Y > 0, and vice versa. The derivative @X > 0, so this can only occur if @Y is
su¢ ciently negative.
1.5 Model Extensions
1.5.1 Endogenous Imitation
Suppose the imitation probability  was endogenous. Given that higher j (and thus
higher j) products are more protable for Northern rms, it makes sense that Southern
imitators would prefer to imitate the highest j goods available rst, to capture instanteous,
albeit extremely brief, higher prots before other rms enter, driving the market to perfect
competition.
Let  = j where
@j
@j
=
@j
@j
> 0. Intuitively, this should only help my result by making
more inelastic goods even riskier for N to export. I again dene the export premium
 =
8>>>><>>>>:
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9>>>>=>>>>;
Claim 11 If pC < wN then if pMj > p
S; only goods for which LS
!LN+LS
 j are exported
Proof. Obvious.
Proposition 12 If Souths share of world population is larger than the probability of imita-
tion, LS
!LN+LS
> j, then rm j will export its product regardless of the level of IPR protection
Proof. Omitted; analogous to proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 13 For rms facing a probability of piracy higher than the population share of
South, LS
!LN+LS
< j, if the Southern competitive price of goods is higher than the Northern
wage (i.e. wS+ > wN), then for any wS; ; LS!LN+LS and strictly increasing piracy probability
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j, where the population share of South is less than the marginal cost to benet ratio of pirated
goods, LS
!LN+LS
< 1
wS+
, there exists a unique cuto¤ ^j such that for all j 2 (1; ^j] Northern
rms corresponding to those varieties will choose to export their product to South, while for
all j 2 (^j;1) Northern rms will not export their product to South. Thus, there exists a
convex (strict) subset, JS (t) ; of the total product set, J (t), which is exported by North to
South.
Proof. Omitted; analogous to proof of Proposition 2
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1.6 Trade and Intellectual Property in the Data
In this section, I explore whether the results of the theoretical model appear in the data.
I test whether there is an asymmetric impact on trade of di¤ering product varieties, as
distinguished by their respective import elasticities3, between strong relative to weak IPR
destination markets. I conduct both cross-section and panel estimations to explore whether
trade product composition varies as a result of di¤ering IPR regimes, and nd that the
results predicted in the theoretical model are consistent with the data.
Throughout the analysis, I conduct each test for both the full sample and the 95th per-
centile of the sample in terms of product demand elasticity (keeping 95% of the goods most
3As estimated in Broda, Weinstein and Greeneld (2006) and further discussed later.
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inelastically demanded and therefore more likely to be di¤erentiated goods). Goods cor-
responding to the highest 5% of demand elasticities represent the homogeneous good and
low-prot di¤erentiated goods in the theory, which correspond to the highest elasticity prod-
ucts and are not theoretically expected to be a¤ected by IPR levels. The results are not
sensitive to the precise choice of the subsample percentile, within some range, but logically
require that not too many of the most elastic goods are removed as it is di¢ cult to de-
ne, elasticity-wise, the exact cuto¤ for which a good becomes homogeneous as opposed to
di¤erentiated4.
1.6.1 Data
I use annual bilateral UN Comtrade product-level import data for 2005 in the cross-
sectional analysis and for the period 1990-2002 in the panel analysis. The trade data contain
information on import value and quantity for each of 250 SITC Rev. 2 4-digit products
for 73 importing countries trading with 73 origin countries. Utilizing a cross-walk between
SITC 4-digit Rev. 2 and HS 6-digit 1998/1992 codes, I match each product-level import to
its corresponding Broda-Weinstein country-specic estimated demand elasticity at the HS
3-digit level, resulting in 102 product categories.
Table 1.1 gives the overall descriptive statistics of the full sample as well as subsamples.
Individual product demand elasticities (s) di¤er across countries, thus several measures
are employed with the corresponding statistics shown in the table. The average standard
deviation of a given products  across countries is 17.15. Details of the di¤erent elasticity
measures used will be discussed in the next section. A detailed description of product
categories at the HS 3-digit level is available in the Appendix.
For the cross-sectional estimation, I also use Park (2008) country-level IPR strength
estimates. For the panel, I use the IP reforms documented in Branstetter et al. (2006) and
defer to their detailed description of the identication of those reforms. Of the 16 national
IP reforms they document, I focus on six (Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, Turkey
and Venezuela), for which there exist both su¢ cient Commtrade data and Broda-Weinstein
country-product elasticities.
4I also conduct a test using the Rauch (1999) classication of good homogeneity as a robustness check,
with all results qualitatively the same.
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1.6.2 Cross-Sectional Evidence
Unilateral Import Data
Using country-product level import data, with importer and product xed e¤ects, I
estimate .
ln(Importsij) = 0 + 1ij + 2IPIndexi + 3ij  IPIndexi + i + j + "ij (1.1)
where Importsij are the imports of product j to i, ij is country is demand elas-
ticity for product j, IPIndexi is a measure of country is IP protection strength, i is a
set of importer xed-e¤ects and j are product xed-e¤ects. IPIndexi is an IPR strength
indicator developed in Park (2008) ranging continuously from 1-5, with 5 representing the
strongest level. In the estimation, I renormalize the elasticities in terms of standard devi-
ations and the Park IP Index on a 0-1 scale in order for the coe¢ cients to have a more
intuitive interpretation. The results are presented in Table 1.2.
The statistic of interest is the coe¢ cient on ij  IPIndexi. These coe¢ cients reect
the relatively lower chance of good j being imported into country i compared to a good
which is more inelastically demanded, when the IP Index of country i is higher. The results
imply that, relative to countries with the lowest IPR strength (a Park index of 1), countries
with the strongest IPRs (an index of 5) observe a .113% lower import value of elastically
demanded goods for every one standard deviation increase in elasticity. This implies that,
not only are goods of di¤erent demand elasticity impacted di¤erently based on the degree
of destination IP protection, but the relatively inelastically demanded goods are the ones
enjoying greater importation under stronger IPRs.
Restricting the sample to exclude implausibly high estimated elasticities above the 95th
percentile of elasticities, which may speak to a high degree of product homogeneity unlikely
to be a¤ected by IPRs, consistent with the theoretical model, I nd that countries with the
strongest IPRs observe a .447% lower import value of elastically demanded goods for every
one standard deviation increase in elasticity relative to countries with the weakest IPRs. So
again, higher IPR countries appear to import relatively inelastically demanded (from their
standpoint) products more than lower IPR countries.
The coe¢ cients on (Importer) are all positive and largely signicant, suggesting that
trade of more elastic goods tends to be greater relative to more inelastically demanded goods
when not accounting for destination IPRs. The coe¢ cients also point to the logical result
that destinations with higher IPRs receive more imports.
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Bilateral Import Data
Full Sample Utilizing bilateral trade data and thus being able to further control for all
bilateral gravity variables via xed-e¤ects, I estimate the following
ln(Importsixj) = 0 + 1ij + 2IPIndexi + 3ij  IPIndexi + ix + j + "ixj (1.2)
with the only di¤erence from (1) being the presence of bilateral xed-e¤ects represented by
ix.
In my model, I had assumed symmetric consumer preferences in both trading partners.
Given that preferences for each good actually d¤er across countries, it is not immediately
obvious which markets import demand elasticities should be used in the empirical analysis.
For example, if the home market was su¢ ciently large in the model and re-exportation was
substantial, a Northern rm might base its export decision more strongly on the protability
(and thus demand elasticity) of its product within the home market. Theoretically, because of
symmetric cross-country product preferences, relative market sizes did not play a substantial
role. However, given that cross-country preferences actually di¤er, it is conceivable that an
exporting rm would weigh its home markets preferences more heavily in making its decision
as its prots may derive mostly from the home market and thus their decision may hinge
primarily on the fear of imitation due to price spillover e¤ects into the home market.
For robustness to check on the sensitivity of results to the choice of which markets elas-
ticity is used for a given product, I run the estimation with 3 specications: (Importer),
(Exporter) and (Trade   weighted), each interacted with the IP index. Due to vari-
ance of product-level elasticity elements across countries, I construct (Trade   weighted)
as a trade-weighted elasticity measure, from the exporters point of view. I do this by
weighting the relative importance of each market, including the home market, in contribut-
ing to the exporters total trade by using the following formula: (Trade   weighted) =
Importx
Importx+Exportx
(Exporterx) +
Exportx
Importx+Exportx
P
8i
Exportsxi
Exportx
(Importeri). The exporters per-
spective is chosen in this constructed elasticity due to the fact that it is the exporter that
determines the traded value based on its customers and their corresponding institutional
environment.
The results are presented in Table 1.3. All coe¢ cients on the various elasticities interacted
with IP (Importer) are negative and signicant in 4 out of 6 specications and all coe¢ cients
on (Importer) are positive and signicant in 5 out of 6 specications.
Using the importer elasticities (rst two columns), the results imply that, relative to
countries with the lowest IPR strength, countries with the strongest IPRs observe a .124%
lower import value for every one standard deviation increase in demand elasticity. Restricting
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the sample to more sensible elasticity estimates, this e¤ect increases to a 1.74% lower import
value for every one standard deviation increase in demand elasticity.
Using the exporter elasticities (middle two columns), the results show that, relative to
countries with the lowest IPR strength, countries with the strongest IPRs see a .038% lower
import value for every one standard deviation increase in demand elasticity. Restricting the
sample to more sensible elasticity estimates, this e¤ect increases to a 2.319% lower import
value for every one standard deviation increase in demand elasticity.
Using the computed trade-weighted elasticities (last two columns), the results also imply
that, relative to countries with the lowest IPR strength, countries with the strongest IPRs
observe a .831% lower import value for every one standard deviation increase in demand
elasticity. Restricting the sample to more sensible elasticity estimates, this e¤ect increases
to a 2.633% lower import value for every one standard deviation increase in demand elasticity,
though this estimate is statistically insignicant.
The results arising from the 3 di¤erent specications speak to the fact that the choice
of which markets product elasticities to use a¤ects the magnitude but not the direction of
the e¤ects. More inelastically demanded goods appear to enjoy a higher amount of trade
in strong IPR conditions relative to more elastic goods, regardless of the choice of which
countrys product elasticity estimates are used. In terms of magnitude, this e¤ect appears
dependent upon the relative weights exporters place on the importance of di¤erent markets
within their trading portfolios.
High Exporter IP Sample Since IPRs are likely to a¤ect primarily origin countries that
already have strong IPRs, I also estimate (2) for the sample restricted to exporters with
IPR strength indices above the 50th percentile of the sample, for a conservative estimate. I
again run the estimation with 3 specications: (Importer), (Exporter) and (Trade  
weighted), each interacted with the IP index.
The results are shown in Table 1.4. All coe¢ cients on the various elasticities interacted
with IP (Importer) are negative and all are signicant but for one specication and all
coe¢ cients on (Importer) are positive but signicant in 4 of 6 specications.
Using the importer elasticities (rst two columns), the results imply that, relative to
countries with the lowest IPR strength, countries with the strongest IPRs see a .222% lower
import value for every one standard deviation increase in demand elasticity. Restricting the
sample to more sensible elasticity estimates, this e¤ect increases to a 2.058% lower import
value for every one unit increase in demand elasticity.
Using the exporter elasticities (middle two columns), the results show that, relative to
countries with the lowest IPR strength, countries with the strongest IPRs observe a .017%
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lower import value for every one standard deviation increase in demand elasticity. Restricting
the sample to more sensible elasticity estimates, this e¤ect increases to a 3.235% lower import
value for every one standard deviation increase in demand elasticity.
Using the computed trade-weighted elasticities (last two columns), the results imply that,
relative to countries with the lowest IPR strength, countries with the strongest IPRs observe
a .158% lower import value for every one standard deviation increase in demand elasticity.
Restricting the sample to more sensible elasticity estimates, this e¤ect increases to a 1.203%
lower import value for every one standard deviation increase in demand elasticity.
Again, the results from the 3 di¤erent estimations highlight the fact that the directional
e¤ect of inelastically demanded goods seeing a greater positive impact from strong IPRs
relative to more elastic goods, though the magnitude can vary depending upon the relative
importance placed on di¤erent markets.
Rauch Classication Sample One might be interested only in the subset of goods which
are objectively classied as di¤erentiated. Rauch (1999) constructed a classication system
of goods by SITC 4-digit Rev. 2 product codes into 3 categories: Homogeneous, Reference-
Priced and Di¤erentiated. I match the bilateral data at the product-level to these Rauch
indicators. I then estimate (2) for both the sample (i) excluding Rauch Homogeneous goods
and (ii) excluding Rauch Homogeneous and Reference-Priced goods (leaving only Rauch
Di¤erentiated products). Again, because Rauchs classication is based on U.S. products
and classications can di¤er considerably across countries, this approach must be interpreted
with caution. Thus, it is still useful to consider results without improbably high elasticity
estimates. The results are shown in Table 1.5, with results for (i) in the rst two columns
and results for (ii) in the last two columns.
The coe¢ cients on (Importer)  IP (Importer) are both negative and signicant and
imply that, relative to countries with the lowest IPR strength, countries with the strongest
IPRs observe a .127% and a .133% lower import value, respectively, of higher relative to
lower elasticity goods that di¤er by one standard deviation. Restricting the sample to the
95th percentile of elasticity estimates, this e¤ect increases to, respectively, a 1.96% and
2.26% lower import value for every one standard deviation increase in demand elasticity.
The coe¢ cients on (Importer) are both positive and signicant, implying, as before, that
higher elasticity goods are unconditionally more likely to be traded.These results are, again,
consistent in sign with the previous cross-sectional results for other samples. The di¤erence
in magnitude is also only marginal.
Let us now briey consider other potential explanations for the empirical evidence. It
could be that products with a higher productivity gap between exporter and importer are
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goods that are both more likely to be sensitive to IP regimes and more likely to be inelastically
demanded in the destination. Then, the result is somewhat built in. It could also be that
an IP reform itself is triggered by a structural change in demand towards more inelastically
demanded goods. However, this does not quite get at why the cross-sectional impact across
countries should vary.
1.6.3 Panel Evidence
Panel analysis was conducted for the following six reforms, Table 1.6, documented in
Branstetter et al. (2006):
The choice of these 6 reforms out of the original 15 national IP reforms documented in
Branstetter et al. (2006) came down to the availability of an adequate panel length of at
least 3 years pre- and post-reform, as well as the availability of country-product-level demand
elasticities as estimated by Broda, Greeneld and Weinstein (2006). I estimate a panel
di¤erence-in-di¤erence model of whether products of di¤ering elasticity are di¤erentially
impacted by a reform. Dening the Pre-Reform period conservatively, I use all country-
product observations from the years immediately before the reform; this amounts to between
3-5 years worth of the sample dened as Pre-Reform. Similarly dening the Post-Reform
period conservatively, I use all observations in years immediately following a reform, resulting
in 3-5 years worth of each sample dened as Post-Reform.
Panel Analysis by Country
For each reforming importing country i, I estimate :
ln(Importsxjt) = 0+1j(Importer)Reformt+2Reformt+x+j+xReformt+"xjt
where Importsxjt are the imports of product j from x in period t, j is country is demand
elasticity for product j, Reformt is an indicator for the Post-Reform period, x is a set of
exporter xed-e¤ects and j are product xed-e¤ects. The x  Reformt control captures
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potential di¤erences in how individual exporting countries may react to the destination
country reform. Results without this added control are identical in all substantive respects.
Tables 1.7.1 and 1.7.2 give the individual country estimation results for the six reforming
countries, both for the full country sample and for the sample excluding the top 5% of import
goods based on elasticity. This exclusion is again based on the idea that exceptionally high
import elasticities (reaching a value over 1500 at its max) may point to either measurement
error in the initial elasticity estimate (see Broda, Weinstein and Greeneld 2006 for estima-
tion details) or an extremely high degree of product homogeneity unlikely to be a¤ected by
any IP reforms.
The individual results consistently show that, not surprisingly, the IP reforms themselves
contribute positively and signicantly in increasing bilateral imports. The primary coe¢ -
cients of interest here, those on (Importer)Reform, can be interpreted as the di¤erential
trade impact of the IP reform on more elastically demanded goods relative to more inelasti-
cally demanded ones. Those coe¢ cients are mostly negative, suggesting that, following an IP
reform, more inelastic goods are more often imported relative to more elastically demanded
goods, however none are statistically signicant.
Pooled Panel Analysis
Pooling together all six country-level reforms, I estimate the following:
ln(Importsixjt) = 0 + 1ij(Importer)Reformit + 2Reformit + ix + j + "ixjt
where Importsixjt are the imports of product j from x to i in period t, ij is country is
demand elasticity for product j, Reformt is an indicator for the Post-Reform period, ix is
a set of bilateral xed-e¤ects and j are product xed-e¤ects.
Table 1.8 presents the results of estimating (3) using pooled data from all 6 IP reforms to
test the combined e¤ect of the IP reforms. Here, again, I nd that the reform has a signicant
positive impact on bilateral imports. The coe¢ cients on ij(Importer) Reformit remain
negative for both the full and 95-percentile samples, but is only signicant in the 95-percentile
sample. The negative signs again suggest that IP reforms have a greater impact in increasing
imports of inelastically demanded products relative to elastically demanded ones.
To summarize, evidence in the panel data appears to support the cross-sectional results,
but are generally not signicant on the ij(Importer)Reformit coe¢ cient, except in the
pooled 95 percentile sample. The reform variable itself appears to have a signicant and
positive impact on import value in every specication.
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1.7 Conclusion: Linking Theory and Empirics
In this paper, I outlined a theoretical framework with which to analyze the e¤ect of
intellectual property rights on the composition of trade and welfare. The model is based
on consumer preferences over di¤erentiated products uniquely identied by their individual
demand elasticities and explores whether and how IPRs a¤ect the set and composition of
goods traded.
A main conclusion of the theoretical section is that relatively inelastically demanded
products should be more often exported to stronger IPR destinations relative to weaker
ones. This is driven by consumer preferences allowing for di¤ering demand elasticities across
goods. Relatively inelastically demanded goods translate into higher prots for the rms
associated with those products, ceteris paribus, and thus higher incentives to protect those
products under threat of IP piracy. In the empirical section, I documented this to be robustly
the case across various subsamples of the cross-sectional data and broadly supported by panel
data as well.
A second insight of the theoretical section is that imports of relatively homogeneous
or elastically demanded goods should not be impacted by destination IPRs, even if they
are among the di¤erentiated products as opposed to the entirely homogeneous goods.
Those are the products for which the prot margin is low enough due to the exporters
higher productivity relative to destination-country rms, that imitation is not protable.
Empirically, this is also supported in both the cross-section and the panel when comparing
the full sample to samples excluding the top 5% most demand elastic products or Rauch
reference-pricedgoods.
A third insight of the theory is related to destination market size. If the destination
market is a big enough share of an exporters trade portfolio relative to the risk of IP piracy
faced by the product, destination IPRs should also not matter for the rm export decision.
Although the bilateral xed e¤ects in the empirical section prevent direct exploration of the
destination size e¤ect, anecdotal evidence on the large import variety enjoyed by frequent
IPR violators such as China and India appears generally to support this.
Standard trade theory assumes a CES utility function with constant markups for which
only the number of varieties matters for consumerstaste for variety. In that environment,
rms of comparable productivity should adjust in the same way to threats of IP piracy on
prots, regardless of which variety they produce. Therefore, trade composition should be
symmetrically a¤ected across varieties and welfare harmed via only the classical number
of varieties channel. In Proposition 2, I showed that this is not the case when consumer
preferences, and thus demand elasticities, di¤er across products. The data also support the
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idea that e¤ects on trade composition are asymmetric across varieties.
Welfare is found in the theory to be potentially non-monotonic in IPR protection for both
North and South. The results di¤er from the current literature in the following respects: (1)
the developing South has the potential to gain from tightened IPRs even in the short-run, via
the additional channel of gaining varieties for which it possesses more inelastic demand, (2)
welfare in the North trades o¤ static consumer and producer welfare and is also ambiguously
a¤ected by stronger IPRs in the South, and (3) there is the possibility of compatible short-
run incentives and the existence of an optimal IPR level even ignoring long-run innovation
e¤ects. An important implication is that when a developing country is small in terms of
consumer market share, has high IP piracy rates, or both, its stands to lose the availability
of goods its consumers care the most about.
Further work could be done to extend the model. One major technical issue that prevents
analytical quantication of welfare e¤ects is the unspecied process of the piracy probabil-
ity, . Because this probability is exogenous and piracy can target any variety with equal
probability, regardless of its prot potential, it is not possible to precisely characterize the
set of pirated products and thus determine net welfare e¤ects. In particular, it would be
benecial to explore the case when pirates target a convex range of goods, so that analytical
characterization of the pirated set nS is possible. Another possible consideration would be to
include the e¤ect of IPR protection on the Northern innovation process, which would require
laying out the innovation process more carefully and exploring dynamic, longer run e¤ects.
Under interpretations of South as a small developing country this may make less sense than
if South is interpreted as a large country that can a¤ect the world market.
While several of the empirical ndings are consistent with the framework of varying
consumer preferences and IP piracy risk, there is much more that can be done. An ideal test
of whether consumer preferences are the underlying mechanism is to control for potential
exporter variance by using rm-product-level data that can account for productivity and
other exporter-level di¤erences. Such data are not readily available. Further research on the
underlying mechanisms driving asymmetric trade composition e¤ects as well as potentially
better functional forms for preferences capturing the essence of di¤ering preference over
variety is needed, but beyond the scope of this paper.
1.8 Mathematical Appendix
Proof. Closed Economy Northern Price Index Derivation
The ideal price index in the North can be represented by the solution to the expenditure
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minimization problem
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Plugging in the monopoly price pNj = j and normalizing the price of the homogeneous good
p0 = 1, we have
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Proof. Proposition 1.2
(Existence)
First note that no Northern rm would choose to export under threat of piracy if wS+ 
wN when LS!LN+LS <  as this would generate negative expected export premium
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In order for there to exist such a cuto¤, we need the export premium to be positive for
lower values of j and negative as j !1. Since we focus on the case where wS+ > wN =
1 ) 9 some j > 1 such that j  wS + . This means that  = (j   1) 
j
1 j
j LS > 0 for
the lowest values of j in the domain j > 1, where j  wS + .
The limit of  as j eventually increases such that j > wS +  is given by limj!1 =h
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(!LN + LS). So to ensure that the export premium, which was initially
positive for low values of j, eventually becomes negative for the high values of j, we needh
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relative marginal gain to a Northern rm of exporting when their product is pirated.
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exists, we know  is a continuous function, thus, invoking the Intermediate
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(Uniqueness)
We know  > 0 for lower values of j and that it is continuous on the entire domain.
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Note that the LHS of the inequality is constant. Let RHS = 
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Since RHS is increasing in j, if  > 0 for some 
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Again, knowing the LHS is constant and that RHS is increasing in j, if  < 0 for some
, it will remain negative-valued for all j thereafter. Thus, single crossing obtains.
38
Proof. Derivation of Open Economy Price Index in South
The price index in South is given by
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Note that for j 2 nN , pj = j and for j 2 nS, pSj = S0 + . Plugging in these and the
Southern competitive price p0 = pSj = 
S
0 + (full derivation in Mathematical Appendix) we
have
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Proof. Derivation of Open Economy Price Index and Prot per-worker in North
Let JN = fj :  < 0g be the set of goods not exported by North. The general form of
the previous closed economy price index in North is reproduced below
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Plugging in the monopoly price pNj = j for goods that are not exported and goods that
are exported and not imitated (JN [ nN), in addition to the Southern competitive price
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Northern per-worker prots, under trade, are now
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Chapter 2
U.S. Firm Exports and Intellectual
Property Rights
2.1 Introduction
In recent years intellectual property rights (IPRs) have become a highly contentious pol-
icy issue, particularly with respect to international trade agreements. At the same time,
increasing evidence has shown that the spread of new technologies is a primary determinant
of income di¤erences across countries and that international trade can play a role in this dif-
fusion.1 In this chapter we investigate for the rst time how IPR policies a¤ect international
trade ows through the extensive margin. We consider two of the central predictions of the
model in Chapter I: (i) that a strengthening of IPR policies should expand the range of
goods exported to a country and (ii) rms with more recently developed products with fewer
substitutes should be more sensitive to IPR policies than other rms due to a higher present
value of prots that remain to be realized. Focusing on the manufacturing sector where such
issues are the most important, we begin by documenting a number of new stylized facts that
explain why IPRs have become such a contentious issue in international trade negotiations;
international trade is disproportionately important to innovative rms and these companies
account for the overwhelming majority of aggregate exports. We then consider a specica-
tion that analyzes the determinants of the destination countries to which rms export. The
results are strongly consistent with the two predictions of the model, suggesting that IPR
policies are closely related to the exporting decisions of rms. We think that our ndings
can inform policy debates concerning IPRs and will likely only grow in importance as new
technologies become increasingly central to economies worldwide.
1See Keller (2004) for an overview of the literature on international technology di¤usion and its relation
to international income convergence, especially via trade.
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Until recently, the literature on intellectual property rights and trade has been mostly
theoretical in nature. The empirical literature to date has delivered mixed results on how a
strengthening of IPRs a¤ects exports. Ferrantino (1993) nds no signicant impact of IPRs
on trade, Smith (1999) nds a negative impact, and Maskus and Penubarti (1995) and Ivus
(2010) have found positive impacts. The problem facing rms, however, should be di¤erent
for the di¤erent margins of trade, yet this distinction has thus far not been explored in the
empirical literature. In policy debates many of the arguments advanced for why IPR policies
should a¤ect international trade are often with respect to the extensive margin of trade of
whether or not rms export to a particular country, rather than just the aggregate volume
of trade. In this chapter, we explore exactly this extensive margin relationship.
As our work is the rst to match comprehensive information on patenting behavior with
export and production activities at the rm level, we are able to provide the most detailed
description to date of the nexus between innovation and trade. Due to data constraints
as well as the fact that manufacturing industries account for the vast majority of patents,
we focus on this sector for the analysis. We nd a powerful relationship between the two
activities, with exporters far more likely than other rms to patent as well as to hold a larger
number of patents conditional on holding one. Patenting rms are also far more likely to
export. Indeed, 82% of rms with patents export to at least one country. Patenting rms
also account for 89% of total exports, even though they only account for 9% of all rms.
We next consider cross sectional evidence on the relationship between trade and intellec-
tual property rights policies. Using an index of IPR protection strength across countries, we
nd that rms with patents are more sensitive to IPR policies than rms without patents.
We further nd that rms with more recently developed patents are more sensitive to IPRs
than rms with older patented technologies. These two ndings are strongly consistent with
the model of Chapter 1 and suggest that the mechanisms explored in this theory can help
explain the composition of trade ows that we observe across countries. These results are
robust across a number of di¤erent estimation approaches and econometric methods.
Our results speak to a number of issues in policy debates. They are consistent, for
example, with the claims of developed country trade representatives that a strengthening
of IPRs should provide additional incentives for exports from their countries. Given the
importance of patenting rms to aggregate trade, they also help explain why this has been a
top priority for US trade negotiators. The ndings further have signicant implications for
welfare in developing countries. IPR reforms should expand the range of goods exported to
the country, which should in and of itself improve the welfare of consumers through love of
variety e¤ects.
Access to an expanded range of intermediate inputs may also benet rms in countries
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that pursue reforms (e.g., Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991). This, too, may further increase
the range of varieties and types of products ultimately available to consumers, generating
dynamic welfare gains. A substantial amount of US exports are of intermediate inputs, and
recent studies have highlighted the importance of access to imported intermediates for rm
productivity and innovation (e.g., Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova, 2010).
Thus, while the debate about whether stronger IPR policies encourage or hinder innovation
is ongoing (e.g., Williams, 2013), our work highlights an indirect channel through which
stronger IPR policies can help spur innovation. This is particularly true with respect to the
developing country context. Our results should therefore inform not only discussions in
trade negotiations but also policy debates within developing countries themselves.
Finally, our results contribute to an understanding of the determinants of cross-country
di¤erences in the standard of living. Empirical studies on the growth experiences of recent
years as well as the work of economic historians has highlighted the important role of tech-
nology di¤usion in determining economic development. International trade has long been
thought of as a conduit for such di¤usion. Our work suggests a subtle relationship between
these two activities. Firms are very much aware of the risks involved in exporting to low
IPR countries, highlighting that while these policies may determine how likely a technology
is to be imitated in the country given that it is sold there, they also determine the range
of products actually sold there in the rst place. This second mechanism is likely to have
dampened the e¤ects of trade as a conduit for technology di¤usion across countries.
In the next section we describe our data and a number of descriptive analyses on the
relationship between trade and innovation. We then discuss the details of our specication
and cross sectional estimations in Section 2.3. We conclude in the last section, discussing
future directions for our work that build upon the analyses presented here.
2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.2.1 Data
Our data come from a number of sources. Information on rmsexports comes from the
Census Bureaus Linked/Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD). It links
export shipments reported by US Customs to individual rms and allows us to follow these
transactions from 1992 to 2008. Data are collected for every export transaction with a value
greater than $2,500 and we recode the shipment values below $2500 as zero for the sake
of consistency. For each shipment, we have information on the value, destination country,
port and a number of other variables. In order to get basic information on rm character-
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istics, we merge the LFTTD with the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), which tracks
employment, payroll, and industry measures for every legally operating business establish-
ment in the Unites States. These establishments can be aggregated to the level of the rm
using identiers developed by the Census. Jarmin and Miranda (2002) provide a thorough
description of the construction of the LBD as well as a number of associated descriptive
analyses.
In order to obtain more detailed information on rm characteristics, we combine this
merged data set with the Census of Manufacturers (CMF). This survey of all manufacturing
establishments in the United States is done every ve years, in the years ending in 2 or 7
(e.g. 1997). We only keep rms with positive employment that appear in both the LBD
and CMF, drop those for whom we have not been able to assign an SIC code using the LBD
data, and then drop those rms who are not determined to be primarily manufacturing rms
from the LBD based on employment counts across sectors. While this has the disadvantage
of restricting our analysis to manufacturing rms, it allows us to account for a far greater
level of rm-level heterogeneity and focuses the analysis on the sectors that matter the
most for these issues. For example, Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2011) document that
manufacturing rms account for approximately 70% of all patents. Manufacturing exports
also account for a substantial portion of US exports, suggesting that these industries are of
primary importance for understanding the e¤ects of intellectual property rights on trade.
Our information on patents come from the US Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO)
and covers the universe of granted patents in the US. Hall, Ja¤e, and Trajtenberg (2001) de-
scribe these records in depth and Griliches (1990) discusses the use of patents as indicators of
innovation. We have updated these records to cover the period from 1975 to 2008, containing
over 4 million granted patents. These data were then merged with the Longitudinal Busi-
ness Database using a bridge originally developed by and described in Kerr and Fu (2008),
Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2011), and Acemoglu, Akcigit, Bloom, and Kerr (2013).
This bridge was developed by using a matching algorithm between rm names and addresses
contained in both the Census data and patent records. We further hand matched a number
of the patents for the largest exporting and R&D rms using the LFTTD and the Censuss
Survey of Industrial Research and Development. We only keep patents with an associated
assignee and only keep private sector patents for the analysis. Following standard practice
in the literature, we consider the date of a patent to be its application year throughout the
various analyses. Based on patent law, a rms total patent stock is measured by aggregating
all of the granted patents that it applied for in the last 20 years.
Our sample of countries is determined by our ability to obtain information on them
from outside sources. In order to control for a number of foreign country characteristics, we
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used information from several additional sources. First, measures of GDP and population
were sourced from the World Bank and were complemented with using information from the
CIA World Factbook for a few missing observations. From Centre dEtudes Prospectives
et dInformations Internationales (CEPII), we obtained measures of (i) whether or not the
country shares a border with the US (ii) an indicator for whether the country shares a
common language with the US, which equals 1 if a language is spoken by at least 9% of
the population in both countries (iii) the number of hours in time di¤erence between the
US and the country (iv) whether the country shares a colonial relationship with the US (i.e.
Britain) and (v) the area of the country in square kilometers. These measures have become
standard covariates in the literature on understanding the determinants of trade ows.
Measures of distance from the US are also sourced from CEPII. They are calculated
following the great circle formula, which uses the latitudes and longitudes of the most im-
portant city in each country in terms of population for the distance from the US. From the
data set developed by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (HMR 2008) we use data on the
similarity of the religious makeup of the country with the US, whether the country is an
island, and whether it is landlocked. The common religion variable is constructed as in the
original study by HMR (2008): (% Protestants in the US  % Protestants in country j)+(%
Catholics in the US % Catholics in country j) + (% Muslims in the US  % Muslims in
country j). This measure has been found to be an important determinant of trade ows, in
particular with respect to the extensive margin of trade.
To measure the strength of intellectual property rights protection across countries, we use
an index (hereafter the "GP index") originally developed by Ginarte and Park (1997) and
updated by Park (2008). This measure was constructed for every ve years going back to 1960
and is based on ve categories of patent protection (i) the extent of coverage of patent laws,
(ii) membership in international patent agreements, (iii) provisions for loss of protection,
(iv) enforcement mechanisms, and (v) duration of protection. Each country receives a score
between zero and one for each category, with an aggregate possible total score of 5. In Table
2.1 in the Appendix, we list the countries in our sample ranked by their GP index. The
ordering makes sense intuitively, with Japan and the countries of Western Europe at the top
of the list and countries like Ethiopia and Mozambique towards the bottom.
2.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
In Table 2.2, we report a number of tabulations with respect to innovative and exporting
activities. Here, as well as in the estimations in Section 2.3, we focus on the year 1997 in
order to take advantage of information on rm characteristics contained in the CMF, which
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is not otherwise available from other sources. While 24% of rms without patents export,
82% of those with patents export, indicating that the vast majority of innovative rms are
connected to the global economy. This result mirrors that of Aw, Roberts, and Xu (2011)
for the Taiwanese electronics industry. It also suggests that international trade is a central
issue for innovative rms, particularly from a policy perspective. Looking at this relationship
from the perspective of trade, 25% of exporters have a patent while only 2% of non-exporters
do. In terms of the average number of countries sold to for exporters, we nd a signicant
di¤erence between rms with patents and those without them. Those without patents export
to three countries on average while those with patents tend to export to eleven on average.
There is signicantly more dispersion, however, in the number of countries exported to for
rms with patents.
Looking at the relationship between trade and innovation from the other side, amongst
rms that have at least one patent, exporting rms have 36 patents on average. Non-
exporting rms only have 2 on average. Similar to the previous statistic, there is signicantly
more variation amongst exporting rms. Considering foreign innovative activity, 9% of rms
that have patents hold at least one in which one of the inventors was located abroad. There
is also a close association with exporting here as well. Exporters are four times more likely
to hold patents as non-exporters. Amongst rms that both hold patents and export, there
is a 53% correlation between the total number of patents held by the rm and the total value
of foreign export sales.
In Figure 2.1, we look across the rm size distribution at the percentage of exports within
each employment decile. For the purposes of disclosure from the Census Bureau, we combine
the Food and Tobacco industries together. We nd that there exists a positive relationship
between rm size and the patent intensity of exports across size categories, and this e¤ect is
particularly strong for the top decile of rms. Figure 2.2 similarly shows signicant variation
in the share of exports that come from patenting rms across industries. The results make
sense intuitively, with industries like Lumber and Wood Products (SIC 24) having low patent
intensity of exports and those like Electronic and Electrical Equipment (SIC 36) having a
high share. We nd signicant variation across industries in (i) the percentage of patenting
rms that export and (ii) the percentage of exporting rms that patent. Both of these
measures are signicantly and positively correlated across industries with the percentage of
exports that come from rms that hold a patent, although they do not track this gure close
to one-for-one. We nd less variation in this measure across regions of the country, with
New England (Census Division 1) with the lowest share at 77% and the area around the
Great Lakes (Census Division 3) at 94%.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the average time path of a rms exports around the time of its
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very rst patent. For this analysis, we identify the year in which a rm rst patented and
restrict the sample to the 1,744 rms that rst patented in our sample period. We consider
the ve years before the year of rst patenting and the four years after, for a total of ten
years including the year in which the rm patented for the rst time. Our data extend from
1993 to 2006 and as such the analysis considers rms that rst patented in the ve year
window between 1998 and 2002.
Figure 2.3 shows that the average number of annual export transactions of a rm is
roughly constant up until the year prior to its rst patent application and then begins to rise
from there on. Figure 2.4 shows a very similar trajectory for the overall value of exports
as well. These results speak to a strong relationship between patenting and rm exports.
We nd that these trends are primarily driven by the top end of the distribution, however.
Median values across rms for these measures tend to increase gradually over time around a
rms rst patent, as does the average number of countries to which rms export. We nd
similar patterns for both mean and median values when limiting the sample to rms with
20 or more employees, rms that exported in each of the ten sample years around their rst
patent, or both.
2.3 Cross-Sectional Estimation
2.3.1 Specication
In order to get a sense of whether there is a relationship between a rms holdings of
intellectual property and the sensitivity of their export behavior to IPR policies in foreign
countries, we consider the following linear probability model:
Exportic = i + c +   Pati GPc + Xic + "ic (2.1)
Here Exportic is an indicator for whether rm i exported to country c. Fixed e¤ects i
account for a variety of rm characteristics, such as productivity, size, and total number of
patents. The xed e¤ects c control for country characteristics such as distance to the US,
GDP per capita, and whether they share a common language with the US. Xic contains
a number of controls that we will discuss briey. Our main object of interest here is the
coe¢ cient  on the interaction term between the indicator for whether rm i holds a patent
Pati and GPc, the GP index of IPR protection for country c normalized to lie between zero
and one. If  is estimated to be di¤erent than zero, this would suggest that there is a
relationship between a rms dependence on the patent system and its decisions of where to
export, in terms of the IPR policies of the countries under consideration.
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2.3.2 Results
In column (1) of Table 2.3 we consider a specication with our basic set of controls.
All estimations cluster standard errors at the level of the rm. In addition to our main
interaction term we include interactions between (i) whether or not a rm had a patent
and the GDP per capita of the country, (ii) the log employment of the rm and the GP
index of the country, and (iii) the productivity of the rm and the GP index of the country,
where productivity is measured with the Solow residual. The rst interaction is to control
for potential di¤ering rm export behavior to destination markets of di¤erent sizes based on
their patenting status, e.g. if patenting rms are more likely to export to wealthier markets.
The second interaction term controls for potential exporting di¤erences to countries with
di¤ering IPR protection based on the size of the rm, e.g. if larger rms are more likely to
export to strong IPR destinations. The nal interaction term accounts for potential export
variation to destinations with di¤erent IPR levels based on rm productivity levels, e.g.,
if more productive rms are more likely to export to destinations associated with stronger
IPRs.
The estimate ^ suggests that an improvement of the destination market GP index from
the lowest to the highest possible value is associated with a 5% increase in the probability
that a rm with a patent exports to the country, relative to a rm without patents, ceteris
paribus. Thus, if a country improved its level of IPR protection from that in Angola to that
of the United Kingdom, for example, this would be associated with a 3.8% increase in the
probability of a rm exporting to said country. This relationship is very precisely estimated,
with a t statistic of 37. The size of this relationship is also economically signicant; as a
benchmark for comparison, the unconditional probability that a rm exports to one of the
countries in our sample is 1.3 percent. Positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cients on
the other interaction terms imply that (i) bigger rms (measured by employment) are more
likely to export to higher IPR markets, (ii) higher productivity rms are more likely to export
to stronger IPR destinations and (iii) patenting rms are more likely to export to wealthier
destination markets.
In column (2) we consider how the relationship between IPR strength and the likelihood
to export varies across di¤erent levels of IPR protection, allowing for the possibility that
the relationship may be non-linear. We dene high IPR protection countries as those with
GP scores between 4 and 5 and those with medium IPR protection strength as those be-
tween 3 and 4. We then consider a specication in which we include interactions between
these indicators and our patent indicator. E¤ects are measured relative to countries with
GP indices below 3. We nd positive, statistically signicant coe¢ cients for each of the
interaction terms, with economically intuitive magnitude di¤erences across the two di¤erent
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interaction terms. The results indicate that a patenting rm is more likely to export to both
a mid-range and a high-range GP index destination than a low GP destination (by 2.6% and
7.1%, respectively) and that the rm is even more likely to export to a high index country
than a medium index country. This suggests that the relationship between patent and IPR
levels is indeed non-linear, but non-linear in the same direction, so that usage of a linear
approximation is not necessarily problematic.
In specication (3) we additionally include a whole bevy of additional controls into our
baseline specication in column (1). In particular, we interact our patent indicator Pati with
a number of di¤erent country characteristics, including (i) distance from the US, measured
in kilometers, (ii) whether or not the country shares a border with the US, (iii) whether or
not the country shares a common language with the US, dened as described above, (iv)
the geographic area of the country in square kilometers, (v) the number of hours in time
di¤erence between the US and the country, and (vi) whether the country shares a colonial
relationship with the US (i.e. Britain). When adding these controls, the coe¢ cient estimate
^ declines modestly but remains economically and statically signicant. The estimations in
columns (1)-(3) are all consistent with the central prediction of the model of Chapter 2, that
IPR policies should be related to the range of products exported to a country through the
extensive margin of trade.
In the nal two columns, we consider one of the other main predictions of the model
in Chapter 2, that rms with more newly developed patents, and hence more inelastically
demanded products, should be more sensitive to IPR policies than other rms due to a
greater discounted value of expected future prots. To do so, we consider two specications
similar to those found in columns (1) and (3). We additionally include an interaction term
between (i) whether or not a rm has a patent, (ii) the GP index for the country, and
(iii) the average age of a rms patents. Consistent with the predictions of the model, the
negative and signicant coe¢ cient on this triple interaction term suggests that rms with
more recently developed products tend to be more sensitive to IPR policies with respect to
their exports. As the average age of a rms patents is 7 years, however, these results suggest
that the age of a rms patents is not the only factor a¤ecting this relationship. Across
columns (4)-(5), the coe¢ cients on the other independent variables remain similar to those
in their counterparts in columns (1) and (3).
We have done a number of robustness checks on these results. Getting to the role of
market size in the model, the regression results are robust to including a measure of total
GDP instead of GDP per capita. Another issue is that considering the binary indicator Pati
for whether the rm has a patent or not may be too strong of a categorization. Using a
measure of the total number of the rms patents in the interaction terms also yields sta-
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tistically signicant e¤ects. Finally, while the results presented here use a linear probability
model, we further come to similar conclusions using the conditional xed e¤ects logit model
of Chamberlain (1980).
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we study how IPR protections in foreign countries a¤ect exports to those
countries through ther extensive margin. We begin by documenting a number of new stylized
facts that suggest the importance of the relationship between trade and innovation. Drawing
upon the model in Chapter 2, we then considered two of its central predictions (i) that IPR
policies should a¤ect the extensive margin of trade and (ii) that rms with more recently
developed patents should be more sensitive to IPR policies than other rms. We nd evidence
consistent with both of these claims that is robust to a number of di¤erent estimation
approaches.
Our results shed light on a poorly understood mechanism by which innovation policies
a¤ect international trade. These e¤ects are likely to impact welfare not only through changes
to the number of varieties of goods available to consumers but also through the range and
quality of imported intermediate goods that rms can use in production. To the extent
that trade a¤ects the di¤usion of ideas, our results also suggest that reduced trade due to
poor intellectual property rights protection is likely to dampen the rate of adoption of new
foreign technologies. This is important for issues of economic development, as innovation
in the US, Japan, and Germany has been found to drive a signicant portion in the growth
in foreign countries (Eaton and Kortum 1996, see also Coe and Helpman 1995). Given the
rise of computer technology and growth in patented innovations in recent years, we think
these issues are only likely to grow in importance. We hope that future research continues
in this vein.
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Chapter 3
Financial Inclusion and Stability in
Africas Middle-Income Countries
3.1 Introduction
Over recent years, nancial inclusion/access to nance has become increasingly impor-
tant to authorities in countries seeking to advance in the development process in a socially
equitable manner1. Financial access is often framed within the context of nancial deepening
and overall nancial development. Research has shown that the positive correlation between
nancial development and growth is highly robust (Levine and Zervos 1993). Thus it is par-
ticularly important to study whether developing countries hoping to spur economic growth
would either spur or jeopardize nancial development by promoting increased nancial access
across the population.
Financial stability and nancial inclusion are often considered to be conicting goals.
For example, nancial stability focuses on asset quality. This means that banks need to be
more selective in terms of to whom they lend and provide nancial services. In contrast,
nancial inclusion focuses on quantity such as size of assets and the number of customers.
This often means that nancial institutions might lower their standards for lending and
reduce the minimum balance requirement or fees associated with opening or maintaining a
bank account. A natural question is then whether greater nancial inclusion might reduce
nancial stability, although if nancial inclusion raises growth, it could also have a positive
impact on banksasset quality and protability. Another question is whether di¤erent types
1Mohan (2006) details these nancial inclusion measures in the case of India: not only is nancial
inclusion essential because of its implications for the welfare of citizens but it needs to be stressed that it
has to be an explicit strategy for fostering faster economic growth in a more inclusive fashion. . . to place
the strategy of nancial inclusion in the wider context of economic growth and nancial deepening.
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of nancial inclusion might a¤ect nancial stability in di¤erent ways. Third, the current
global regulatory reforms will likely encourage banks funding structures to shift towards
greater holdings of equity and deposits. The paper will verify whether this funding structure
shift will strengthen nancial stability.
In this paper, we address each of the above issues, by exploring the following questions:
How has the nancial landscape in SSA MICs evolved? How does the nancial landscape
(stability and inclusion) in SSAMICs compare relative to emerging market economies (EMs)?
How do nancial inclusion and funding structure shifts impact nancial stability? Does the
particular type of nancial access matter? We utilize a novel econometric application of
binary response models to explore the intersection of these two branches of research and
analyze whether stability and access can coexist in tandem in an attempt to ll the gap in
quantifying whether a relationship exists between stability and access, what the relationship
is and what channels it operates through.
We analyze nancial stability at the bank level in Middle-Income Countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA MICs). Our sample covers 227 banks in the 11 SSA MICs, spanning
up to 15 years, from 1998-2013. We conduct a joint bank-level stress test determining the
probability of bank default stemming from standard causal factors, additionally including
various inclusion indicators as explanatory variables. We measure nancial access utilizing
the following country-level individual and small- and medium-enterprise (SME) access in-
dicators from the World Bank Financial Access Survey and Enterprise Survey: percentage
of adults saving to total adults, percentage of adults borrowing to total adults, percentage
of SMEs identifying access to nance as a major business constraint and small rms with
access to a credit line as a percentage of total small rms. The use of a variety of access
indicators serves both the function of a robustness check of indicator validity as well as a
means by which we can di¤erentiate between e¤ects of di¤erent types of nancial inclusion.
Our ndings suggest the following: (i) nancial stability and nancial inclusion for in-
dividuals in SSA are comparable to a group of EMs2 while nancial inclusion for small and
medium enterprises (SMEs) lags behind EMs; (ii) nancial inclusion focusing on expanding
SMEs access to nance and individualsaccess to savings accounts enhances nancial sta-
bility while nancial inclusion focusing purely on expanding the percentage of individuals
with credit undermines nancial stability; and (iii) a more equity and deposit based funding
structure enhances nancial stability.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.1.1 reviews the literature. Section 3.2 reviews
the evolution of the overall nancial landscape and of nancial inclusion in the 11 SSA MICs
2The group of emerging market economies is selected based on the April 2012 IMF Regional Economic
Outlook for Africa, peer countries to South Africa. The EM countries are listed below in page 7.
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in comparison with a group of selected EMs, Section 3.3 analyzes the impact of nancial
inclusion and banks funding structure on nancial stability. Section 3.4 discusses policy
measures to promote nancial inclusion while enhancing stability.
3.1.1 Literature Review
Much work has been done on nancial sector stability and a growing body of the literature
is focusing on nancial access as well. The literature on nancial inclusion/access primarily
focuses on exploring the e¤ects of individuals access on income inequality, poverty, and
GDP growth. For example, The Global Financial Index (Findex) surveys how adults in 148
economies save, borrow, make payments, and manage riskand nds that high cost, physical
distance, and lack of proper documentation are the most common barriers to individual access
(WB GFDR 2013, Demirgüç-Kunt & Klapper 2012). Additionally, Demirgüç-Kunt, Beck,
and Honohan (2008) illustrate that nancial access is quite limited around the world and
identify barriers that may be preventing small rms and poor households from using nancial
services. Based on this research, the report derives principles for e¤ective government policy
on broadening access. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2003) explore the e¤ects of
rm-level nancial access and nd that nancial constraints are strongest for small rms and
weakening these constraints disproportionately benets smaller rms.
The literature on nancial stability is vast and diverse. Most of the literature has focused
on measures and indicators for nancial stability (FSIs). Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache
(1998), Kaminsky, et al (1998), Bordo and Schwartz (2000) pioneered early warning indica-
tors on macro-nancial stability based on risk spreads, market liquidity, etc.
Work has also been done to look at predictors of banking crises. Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache (1997) use a multivariate logit estimation to identify determinants of banking
crises in a panel of developing and industrialized countries. They found that weak macroeco-
nomic environments with low growth, high ination, high real interest rates, explicit deposit
insurance schemes and weak law enforcement were particularly vulnerable to economy-wide
banking crises. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) survey the literature on crisis pre-
diction and identify two main methodologies of the cross-country empirical work in this eld
based on the signal approach and the multivariate probability model.
Other threads of the literature on nancial stability look at: the role of central banks
in promoting and maintaining nancial sector stability (Nier 2009), bank competition and
stability (Berger et al. 2009), nancial liberalization and crisis (Caprio and Summers 1993),
external shocks and crisis (Eichengreen and Rose 1998), bank ownership and structure as they
relate to crisis (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2002) and the role of institutions
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and of the political system in causing and preventing crises (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Levine 2004).
The literature on the intersection between nancial stability and access has, however,
been underexplored. Hannig and Jansen (2010) perform a largely qualitative study regard-
ing the risks and benets of inclusion and nd that nancial inclusion can pose risks in terms
of overall nancial sector reputation and quality, but that low-income savers and borrowers
maintain solid nancial behaviourthough crises periods and that the presence of vulner-
able clients in the nancial system has negligible risks. They show a positive correlation
between GDP per capita and inclusion, but stop short of establishing a causal relation-
ship. Similarly, Khan (2011) shows a positive relationship between nancial inclusion, as
measured in terms of commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults and deposits per 1000
adults, and development as measured by World Bank Development country categories (High
Income, Low Income, etc.). This, however, is based purely on graphical correlation. Aduda
and Kalunda (2012) explore nancial inclusion and stability with reference to Kenya and
postulate that it is very likely that banking performance, and the likelihood of crises, may
depend on the structure and degree of development of the nancial systems which is one of
the focal point [sic] in nancial inclusion.However, there is no quantitative analysis.
This paper addresses a di¤erent question from previous work and provides the rst quan-
titative evidence that we know of on the impact of nancial inclusion and shifts in funding
structure on stability. Rather than focusing on a qualitative or descriptive assessment based
on correlations, we attempt to establish quantitatively whether a causal link exists between
nancial inclusion, funding structure and stability. We also look at whether and which types
of nancial inclusion exist that are stability friendly. This analysis focuses on bank-level
stability. This approach is taken in the context of SSA for several reasons. First, the bank-
ing sector in SSA is relatively small; with 227 banks in the sample, nancial inclusion is
very important for these countries. Second, nancial access levels can have di¤ering impacts
on heterogeneous banks and a bank-level analysis can account for fundamental di¤erences
between individual banks that may be a¤ecting stability, better isolating the e¤ect of each
individual explanatory variable without use of aggregation and its resulting distortions.
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3.2 Financial Landscape in Sub-Saharan AfricanMiddle-
Income Countries
3.2.1 Data
The dataset includes bank-level data for 227 banks in SSA over the period 1998-2013.
There are 11 SSA MIC countries covered: Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Lesotho, Mauri-
tius, Namibia, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zambia. These countries
are the only middle-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa as o¢ cially classied by the
IMF and World Bank. Country-level nancial stability and access data for a group of EM
countries are also included for 2011 for benchmarking purposes. The EM countries are:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Republic of Korea,
Mexico, Malaysia, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia Federation, Thailand, Turkey
and Ukraine. These countries were chosen based on the peer group, in terms of population
and GDP, of South Africa from the IMF Regional Economic Outlook 2012.
Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of bank Z-scores for our sample, with the red vertical
line demarcating the 10th percentile cut-o¤ later used in our Probit analysis (more details to
follow). The gure shows a substantial variation of Z-scores across our sample of 227 banks.
Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of bank-level ln(Z-scores) across the 11 countries of our
sample, demonstrating that variation hardly exists at the country-level, lending credence to
our bank-level analysis, controlling for bank-level variables.
3.2.2 Evolution
Looking at the nancial landscape of the 11 SSA MIC countries over time, we focus on
a number of key variables: bank private credit to GDP, overall nancial system deposits to
GDP, return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and banking sector Z-score (dened
as [(Equity/Assets)+ROA]/SD(ROA)), which is a measure of default risk. Figure 3.1 shows
area graphs of the key variables, with the mean in orange, median in green and the range of
the statistics across the 11 sample countries shaded in gray.
First, looking at bank private credit to GDP (%) in Figure 3.1, Panel 1, SSAMICs appear
to be experiencing overall growth in this area over the past decade, suggesting nancial
deepening is taking place. The sample average lies at about 36.3% in the most recent
available year, 2011.
Financial system deposits to GDP (%), shown in Figure 3.1, Panel 2, also appear on the
rise for most SSA MICs with the most notable exception of Botswana and some recent loss
in growth in Seychelles. The group average rose to 46.5%, up from 37.9% in 1999.
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Overall ROA (%), Figure 3.1, Panel 3, a measure of banking sector protability, appears
to be stabilizing at around 2% on average across the sample, which, although down from
2.36% at the beginning of the sample period, is robust.
The banking sector Z-score, Figure 3.1, Panel 4, a popular measure of nancial stability,
remains stable over the period, although there are notable decreases on this front stemming
from Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa. The average Z-score has fallen from 17.52 to
14.91, primarily due to deterioration in the aforementioned three countries. However, overall
stability in the region appears to be converging at around 12.3 with Senegal as the group
leader with a Z-score of 38.42.
3.2.3 Benchmarking
Financial Stability
We compare our group of 11 SSAMIC countries to the non-SSA EM group of 20 countries
for the most recent year for which all data is available, 2011.
In terms of bank capital to assets (%), Figure 3.2, Panel 1, the MICs fare slightly better
compared to the EM group with an average capital to asset ratio of 10.3% versus just 10%
across EMs. This is driven primarily by the exceptionally high capital to asset ratio of South
Africa and, to a lesser extent, Ghana.
Banking sector concentration, measured as the percentage of banking sector assets held
by the top 3 banks (Figure 3.2, Panel 2), remains high for the SSA MICs at 79.5% relative
to the EMsaverage of 51.1%. This is true even for each country individually relative to
the EMs and is fairly characteristic of the African banking sector as a whole. This could
indicate continued nancial sector vulnerabilities due to substantial presence of systemically
important nancial institutions (SIFIs).
The ROA (%), Figure 3.2, Panel 3, for SSA MICs averages 2%, compared to 1.2% for
the EM group. The higher returns appear to be across the board for almost all SSA MICs,
however is particularly notable in Botswana. This could be suggestive of potentially more
lucrative investment return opportunities in the rapidly growing region or it may be due to
the e¤ect of a more concentrated banking sector relative to the EMs.
However, the banking Z-score indicator of stability in Figure 3.2, Panel 4 shows slightly
more nancial stability in SSAMICs compared to EMs, with an average Z-score of 14.9 versus
13.4. This suggests that, despite potential vulnerabilities stemming from high concentration,
the banking sector retains reasonable levels of capital to cover potential losses in equity. This
is likely driven by the relatively higher asset returns in SSA MICs, potentially due to greater
bank concentration coupled with a general stabilization of the volatility on those returns.
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Financial Access
We also compare the 11 SSAMICs to the EM group, in 2011, in terms of access to nance,
both at the individual and at the small-medium enterprise (SME) level. The indicators
used are: percentage of adults saving, percentage of adults borrowing, percentage of SMEs
reporting facing a nancial access constraint, percentage of rms with a credit line and
percentage of small rms with a credit line.
In terms of percentage of adults saving, which can be thought of as an indicator of
individual saving rate SSA MICs average 15.8% versus 16.5% for the EM group, suggesting
that access to saving accounts between SSA MICs and the selected EM group is comparable.
In addition, the di¤erence is largely driven by the EM outliers Rep. of Korea and Thailand.
With respect to percentage of adults borrowing, the average for SSA MICs stands at
7.33% compared with a 9.58% average for the EM countries. This is despite the relatively
high percentage observed in Mauritius. Fewer individuals in the SSA middle-income region
appear to have the option of nancial access in the form of borrowing.
The percentage of SMEs reporting facing a nancial access constraint (based on the
Enterprise Survey) averages 33.94% for SSA MICs compared to 23.6% in the comparison
group. This di¤erence is consistent even on an individual country basis, with individual SSA
MIC countries reporting higher numbers for this statistic than individual EMs. Among these,
Ghana faces the highest reported access constraints. This implies that nancial constraints
facing SMEs in SSA middle-income countries may be more common relative to EMs.
In terms of the percentage of small rms with a credit line, SSA MICs also fare worse
compared to EMs with 24% of small rms having access to a line of credit, as compared
to 37.8% for the EM group. This points to the fact that access to credit appears far less
prevalent for rms in the SSA MICs relative to EMs and is consistent with other SME access
survey indicators.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
The framework centers around two econometric models of the determinants of stability.
The rst is a baseline Probit model with the probability of bank distress as the dependent
variable. The second is a standard OLS estimation with percentage deviation, or distance,
from bank insolvency as the dependent variable. The use of the distance to insolvency, or Z-
score, as a measure of nancial stability has substantial precedence in the nance literature3.
3See Altman 2000 for a thorough treatment of the use of Z-scores in predicting nancial distress.
68
3.3.1 Baseline Probit Model
In this section, we explore the e¤ects of nancial access on nancial stability and, par-
ticularly, whether individual or SME nancial access a¤ects distress probability di¤erently.
Traditional measures of bank distress in the literature include the book-price ratio, analyst
ratings and the Z-score. We focus on the Z-score measure of bank distress as it has become
the most frequently used indicator, in addition to having greater data availability.The Z-
score measure of bank stability is computed at the level of the bank and equals the return on
assets (ROA) plus the capital asset ratio (CAR) of the bank divided by the banks standard
deviation of return on assets. It proxies for the risk of bank insolvency as it is the inverse
of the probability that losses exceed equity; that is, a higher Z-score implies lower risk of
insolvency (see Box 1 for derivation details).
The traditional factors a¤ecting bank distress can be grouped as: (1) funding structure
indicators (e.g. Herndahl funding diversity index, the ratio of loans to customer deposits,
the ratio of short-term funding to assets, the ratio of equity to assets, the ratio of term
deposits to assets), (2) protability and asset quality (return on average assets, return on
average equity, the ratio of loan loss provisions to gross loans and net interest margin), (3)
Size (total assets, asset growth) , (4) macroeconomic factors (e.g. ination, output growth),
and nancial access variables (e.g., individual and SMEs access to nance at the country
level). Thus, in tackling our question, we must control for the e¤ects of these other factors.
We proceed rst by estimating a Probit model of probability of nancial distress:
P fDistressijt j Xijt 1;Wjtg = F
 
Xijt 1ij +Wjtj

(3.1)
where Pfg is the probability that bank yi from country j will be in distress at time t,
conditional on bank-specic and country-level characteristics Xijt 1 and Wjt. Pfg is based
on the Z-score and is a decreasing function of the Z-score. F () is the standard normal
distribution function that transforms a linear combination of the explanatory variables into
the [0; 1] interval.
Distressijt is measured by bank-level Z-scores, with a threshold at the 10th percentile
of Z-scores within the sample4, which is equivalent to being above the 10th percentile in
probability of default (see Box 1 in Appendix). The presence of bank-specic lagged ex-
planatory variables, Xijt 1, is primarily to reduce endogeneity concerns and report robust
standard errors, but also to control for bank-level characteristics (e.g. size) that may make
4The 10th percentile threshold was chosen in line with that of a recent estimation in Global Financial
Stability Report October 2013 utilizing a similar model of probability of bank default. In that estimation,
the 10th percentile of bank Z-scores for that sample was chosen.
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an individual bank particularly sensitive or insensitive to country-wide macroeconomic con-
ditions. Finally, country-specic explanatory variables,Wjt, must also be included to control
for macroeconomic conditions that can obviously impact a given banks default probability.
The explanatory variables used are summed up in the following table, with more detailed
descriptions given in Table 3.2 of the Appendix.
3.3.2 Baseline Logarithmic Model
We attempt to look at the relationship in levels and ensure that our Probit results are
not sensitive to the choice of binary cuto¤ threshold by looking at the impact of explanatory
variables on the percentage change in Z-score, that is, ln (Z-score).
We estimate a standard linear regression of ln (Z-score) on bank-level explanatory vari-
ables, Xijt 1, and macro-level stability variables, Wjt:
ln (Z-score) = F
 
Xijt 1ij +Wjtj

(3.2)
In order to include observations corresponding to negative values of the Z-score, which
cannot be log-transformed, we adjust additively relative to the minimum Z-score using
ln (Z-score+min(Z-score)+1) in order to keep all observations under the previous binary
dependent variable estimation in this analysis as well. All other explanatory variables are
kept the same and given in the following table. The estimation again uses lagged bank-level
explanatory variables in order to reduce endogeneity concerns and report robust standard
errors.
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3.3.3 Dependent Variables
Probit
PfZ<10th percentileg is a binary dependent variable representing the probability that
a banks Z-score is below the 10th percentile of Z-scores of regional banks, putting it at risk
of default relative to other banks in the sample. As the Z-score represents the adequacy of
a banks capital to cover potential equity losses and thus is directly and inversely related
to the probability of default, higher values of the Z-score correspond to greater solvency.
This cuto¤ is equivalent to the probability of a bank experiencing a default being amongst
the top 10 percentile of sample banks (see Box 3.2 in Appendix for proof). Thus positive
coe¢ cients on explanatory variables would indicate a negative contribution of that variable
towards bank-level stability. The 10th percentile is chosen as a measure in line with the
convention in related literature (c.f. IMF Global Financial Stability Report, October 2013);
other nearby cuto¤s were tested for robustness with very similar results.
ln(Z-score)
ln (Z-score) is a continuous dependent variable representing the percentage increase rel-
ative to the lowest bank Z-score present in the sample. Under this dependent variable,
positive coe¢ cients on explanatory variables correspond to greater solvency and a decreased
probability of bank default. This variable is auxiliary in our analysis due to the fact that the
true relationship between explanatory variables and bank stability is likely piece-wise linear.
Thus, beyond a certain point of high values of Z-score, observed explanatory variables may
have increasingly weak marginal impacts on stability and unobserved variables may carry
more weight; this can appear in an estimation as a weakening of the causal link between
independent variables and dependable variable (nancial stability).
In order to account for potential non-linear relationships between explanatory variables
and ln(Z-score), we performed local polynomial smoothing analysis of all variables and found
that non-linear relationships existed for variables Total Assets and the ratio of Short-term
Funding to Assets. We adjust for these non-linear relationships by including splines for these
two non-linear variables in the estimation. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 in the Appendix show the
local polynomial smoothing graphs and demonstrate the kinks in the series that represent
the spline cut-o¤s (detailed in the variable explanation section of the Appendix).
3.3.4 Independent Variables
The independent variables are explained in detail in the Appendix.
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3.4 Empirical Findings
In general, we nd that higher equity to assets, term deposits to assets, and percentage
of adults saving lead to increased stability. We also nd that higher ratios of loans to
customer deposits, percentage of adults borrowing, percentage of SMEs facing nancial access
constraints and less diverse funding sources lead to increased probability of banking sector
distress.
The Probit estimations are conducted using the two measures of SME access separately,
due to collinearity issues, although results with either measure of SME access are similar.
Under SME Access Constraint as reported in the World Bank Enterprise Survey, individual
bank size, term deposits to assets, equity to assets, country legal index and both individual
access as well as SME access variables are signicant determinants for bank-level stability.
The signs of these coe¢ cients give a sense of their contribution to nancial stability. Recall
that in the Probit analysis, our dependent variable is a measure of likelihood of bank distress,
that is, the inverse of nancial stability. Bank size, measured as total assets, has a positive
and highly signicant e¤ect on the probability of distress. The proportion of assets that are
term deposits increases stability signicantly.
Negative coe¢ cients indicate that the variable is associated with greater bank stability
while positive coe¢ cients indicate the variable is associated with greater bank distress. Ta-
bles 3.6-3.10 present our empirical ndings. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 present the baseline Probit
estimation results, while tables 3.8 and 3.9 give the Probit marginal e¤ect estimates for a
sense of the quantitative magnitude of the e¤ects we nd. Table 3.10 gives the results using
the logarithm of the Z-score as the dependent variable, as a robustness check to ensure that
the results are insensitive to the choice of Z-score cut-o¤ in the binary response analysis.
Note that the signs of the Probit estimation coe¢ cients, Tables 3.6 and 3.7, give the
direction of the e¤ects, but the coe¢ cients themselves do not give a sense of the magnitude
of the e¤ect. This is due to the fact that the coe¢ cient magnitudes are in the units of the
standard errors. In Table 3.6, the specications in columns (1)-(3) contain slightly di¤erent
explanatory variables that cannot all be included in one specication due to collinearity
problems. For example, (1) includes the HDI index of human development, which is highly
collinear with the access to international markets indicator variable included in (3). Simi-
larly in Table 3.7, various specications are explored for robustness to di¤erent explanatory
variables. For example, the inclusion of the Net Interest Margin variable in (3) is highly
collinear with a banks proportion of loan loss provisions to gross loans.
For a sense of true magnitude, we separately calculate the average marginal e¤ects for
the explanatory variables to obtain the discrete change in probability of banking distress
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averaged across the sample values of the other predictor variables. These estimates are given
in Tables 3.8 and 3.9. For example, to calculate the average predicted probability of distress
for a given percentage of adults saving, the predicted probability was calculated for each
bank-year, using that banks values of explanatory variables for that year, and the average
was taken across all these predicted probabilities.
In Table 3.8, column 1, the marginal e¤ect of the adults saving percentage tells us that
the derivative of the mean expected probability of bank distress with respect to adults saving
is -0.272. This suggests that if we had 4 banks and then increased the percentage of adults
saving by 1%, this would cause one bank to switch from being likely to default to being
unlikely to. The .0371 coe¢ cient on SME access constraint suggests that if we had 27
banks and then lowered the SME access constraint by 1%, this would cause one bank to
switch from being likely to default to being unlikely to. The .449 coe¢ cient on percentage of
adults borrowing suggests that, of just 2.2 high default probability banks, one would become
more solvent and unlikely to default if adult borrowing decreased by 1%. The coe¢ cient
magnitudes in columns 2-3 are nearly identical.
In Table 3.9, column 1, using the percentage small rm credit line variable as a measure
of SME nancial access instead, we have the same directional e¤ects on all variables but the
magnitudes of the e¤ects di¤er. There, the marginal e¤ect of adults saving percentage on
probability of bank distress is equal to -0.046. This suggests that if we had 22 banks and
increased the percentage of adults saving by 1%, this would cause one bank to switch from
being likely to default to being unlikely to. The .057 coe¢ cient on adults borrowing suggests
that, of 18 high default probability banks, one would become more solvent and unlikely to
default if adult borrowing decreased by 1%. The -.0365 coe¢ cient on percentage of small
rms with a credit line suggests that a 1% increase in the percentage of small rms with a
credit line leads to a .037% decrease in probability of distress.
Table 3.10 shows the results obtained using the dependent variable ln (Z-score), renor-
malized so that negative Z-score observations are also reected5. The rst two columns
represent the estimation comparing individual access to rm-level access, using the SME
Access Constraint of rm-level nancial access. The last two columns represent the estima-
tion comparing individual access to rm access, using the small rm credit line percentage
measure. The interpretation of these coe¢ cients follows straight from the table and sup-
port the Probit estimation results in both the directional e¤ect and the magnitude e¤ect of
variables.
Focusing on the SME Access Constraint measure, Table 3.10, column 1, we nd that a
1% increase in the percentage of adults saving improves bank stability as measured by the
5Detailed explanation of renormalization in variable explanations in Appendix.
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Z-score by 7.42%. A 1% increase in adults borrowing reduces the Z-score by 3.83% and a 1%
increase in SME access constraint is associated with a 5.74% reduction in the Z-score measure
of stability. Using the small rm credit line measure of SME nancial access, see Table 3.10,
column 3, we nd results consistent with the SME access measure of inclusion. A 1% increase
in percentage of adults saving is associated with a 4.11% increase in Z-score-measured bank
stability, a 1% increase in small rms with a credit line leads to a 1.55% increase in the
Z-score, while a 1% increase in percentage of adults borrowing leads to a 5.92% decrease in
stability. As expected and consistent with the Probit analysis, term deposits to assets and
return on average equity both have positive and signicant causal e¤ects on bank stability,
while bankstotal asset growth has a negative impact on stability.
3.5 Conclusion
3.5.1 Main Findings
The results of the empirical analysis in this chapter suggest the following broad ndings
for selected MICs in SSA.
First, the nancial landscape in SSA MICs has deepened over the past decades, as re-
ected in an increasing share of the stock of private credit to GDP and deposits as ratio to
GDP. Furthermore, their return on assets has stabilized to a lower level, consistent with a
maturing and more competitive nancial sector in SSA MICs.
Second, in many of the MICs in SSA, one reason for the low level of nancial inclusion
is SMEs lack of access to nance. Our study results show that SME access to nance has
a positive and signicant impact on nancial stability. Financial usage can have stabilizing
e¤ects on the nancial sector by helping to increase nancial sector depth. If borrowing
tends to be used for investment purposes or to nance asset purchases generating returns,
overall this would be benecial to the nancial sector and the economy in general. Thus,
nancial inclusion focusing on enhancing SME access to nance tends to enhance nancial
stability.
Furthermore, another reason for the low level of nancial inclusion is that relatively poor
households do not have access to bank accounts due to various reasons such as the minimum
balance requirement, fees for opening or maintaining a bank account with low balance, or
absence of nancial institutions in lower income communities. Therefore, nancial inclusion
focusing on improving householdsaccess to bank accounts will enhance nancial stability.
Specically policy measures such as reducing or eliminating the minimum balance require-
ment or fees for opening/maintaining bank accounts with lower balances should increase
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inclusion. Alternatively, using new technology such as e-banking or mobile banking will
facilitate the populations access to nance.
Moreover, nancial inclusion that overly relies on increasing householdsaccess to credit
by lowering lending standards encouraging low quality creditors to take out una¤ordable
loans/mortgages can be destabilizing. In the short run, these policies may mechanically
increase nancial inclusion, but in the long run, this will likely jeopardize nancial stability
which will ultimately undermine nancial inclusion.
Finally, the primary components of global regulatory reforms will likely steer banksfund-
ing structures further toward deposits and equity with less reliance on short-term wholesale
funding. This funding structure will likely have a positive impact on nancial stability.
3.5.2 Policy implications
We would like to draw the following key policy messages from the above ndings. First,
policies promoting SME sector development should enhance nancial stability. Second, re-
forms that facilitate individualsaccess to savings accounts will also promote nancial sta-
bility. However, mechanically expanding the number of people with credit may lead to over
indebtedness. This could undermine nancial stability. In a number of countries, the author-
ities tend to overly promote loans to households in pursuit of greater nancial inclusion. This
has led to over indebtedness of households. Finally, global regulatory reforms will likely have
a positive impact on nancial stability by shifting banksfunding structure more towards
capital and deposits.
However, our results and messages should be interpreted with some caution. There are
no one-size-ts-all approaches to striking an appropriate balance between nancial inclusion
and nancial stability. The policy of enhancing nancial stability of each country has to take
into consideration its country-specic circumstances.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Explanation of Independent Variables
Bank-level Variables
Herndahl Index The Herndahl index of bank funding relates to the diversity of a
banks funding structure. It is calculated as the sum of the squares of the share of funding
attributed respectively to deposits, debt, and equity, with higher values implying lower
diversity in funding structure: (Customer Deposits/Assets)2 + (Equity/Assets)2 + (Non-
Deposit Debt/Assets)2. Diversity of funding is important as it has been found that banks
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with weaker pre-nancial crisis structural liquidity and higher leverage were more likely to
fail during the crisis6. We expect that greater bank funding diversity should reduce the risk
of fallout from inadequacy of any individual source of funding.
Loan-Customer Deposits Ratio Bank loan-deposit (LTD) ratios are standard indicators
of bank liquidity. Ex ante, we would expect higher LTD ratios to be associated with greater
risk of instability. LTD ratios of less than one indicate that a bank used its own deposits to
make loans to customers without resorting to outside borrowing and re-loaning. High LTD
ratios mean that banks may not have the liquidity to cover unexpected funding obligations
or periods of nancial crises.
Short-term debt to Assets Ratio The short-term (ST) debt (debt maturing with one
year) to asset ratio is a nancial leverage ratio. If this ratio is very high, it indicates that the
bank may not have enough cash or cash equivalents to pay o¤ ST debts. High levels of ST
debt exposes a bank to high borrowing costs that could negatively a¤ect prots. ST debt is
more vulnerable to sudden increases in the interest rate or uctuations in investor condence.
It has been shown that ST debt is a better indicator for nancial crisis than even the oft-used
private credit to GDP measure7. On the other hand, countries with underdeveloped legal
environments for disclosure and investor protection have limited long-term debt capacity,
thus ST debt is a necessity for nancing illiquid investments (particularly of the low-credit
variety associated with new borrowers8). In this sense, high ST debt to asset ratios may be
unavoidable and not necessarily immediately indicate instability. In our sample, we do nd
a non-linear relationship between ST debt to assets and bank stability under the ln(Z-score)
measure (see Figure 3.4).
Equity to Assets Ratio The equity to assets ratio is a leverage ratio used to determine
the amount of assets on which shareholders have a residual claim, in other words, how much
shareholders would receive in the event of bank liquidation. In the aftermath of the global
nancial crisis it has been widely considered that banks funding with too little equity create
a fragile and distorted nancial system more prone to crisis9.
6Bank Funding Structures and Risk: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis. IMF Working Paper
WP/12/29. Prepared by Francisco Vazquez and Pablo Federico
7Short-term Debt and Financial Crises.Krishnamurthy, A. and A. Vissing-Jorgensen (2012). Kellogg
School, Northwestern University.
8Banks, Short Term Debt and Financial Crises: Theory, Policy Implications and Applications.Diamond
& Rajan, 2001.
9The BankersNew Clothes,Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig.
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TermDeposits to Assets Term deposits are customer deposits that have a xed maturity
date, are interest-bearing and are not subject to immediate and unlimited withdrawal by
the depositor. Higher proportions of term deposits are associated with more long-term bank
stability and are used by ratings agencies such as Moodys in bank stability ratings, with
higher ratios corresponding to higher stability ratings.
Return on Average Equity Return on average total equity measures how much prot a
company generates with the money shareholders have invested. This percentage represents
the average return across various types of equity: common equity, non-controlling interest,
securities revaluation reserves and other accumulated comprehensive income. Generally, the
greater the return on equity, the better is the protability of the bank and thus we would
expect this variable to be negatively correlated with probability of distress.
Loan Loss Provisions to Gross Loans The loan loss provision (LLP) to gross loans
ratio is an indicator of the amount of capital bu¤ers. LLPs represent an expense set aside
as an allowance for NPLs. In general, the greater the proportion of LLPs to gross loans, the
more stable the bank should be as it has bu¤ers in place in the event of potential capital
shortfalls.
Net Interest Margin Total interest income less total interest expense (annualized) as a
percent of average earning assets. This indicator measures how successful a rms investment
decisions are relative to its debt. A negative value implies that interest expenses were
greater than the amount of returns generated by investments and thus NIM is expected to
be positively correlated with stability.
Size Bank size is measured by a banks total assets. Assets are what a bank owns, including
loans, reserves, investment securities, and physical assets. Total assets are as reported rather
than weighted according to perceived risk of potential loss. It has traditionally been an
important determinant of bank stability, although this relationship can be non-linear, as
shown in this sample with respect to the ln(Z-score) measure (see Figure 3). Higher levels of
bank assets can help to improve stability in terms of covering potential losses, however very
high levels of assets can speak to the existence of easy credit and excess loans which may
end up as destabilizing NPLs.
Total Asset Growth A moderate growth rate usually indicates stable or improving bank
nances. A declining growth rate may indicate a sluggish economy or can be an indicator of
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internal bank problems. Generally, a rapid asset growth rate is thought to be undesirable if
opportunities to place the growth into high quality earning assets do not exist. Asset growth
likely has a non-linear relationship with stability and should be managed in a manner that
will not adversely impact the quality of the banks investments, the banks liquidity position
or its capital adequacy.
Country-level Variables
Percentage of Adults Saving This indicator measures individual nancial usage for
saving purposes. This indicator is based on the Global Findex household survey. Savings
can contribute in several ways to overall nancial stability. If household savings are used by
banks e¢ ciently in generating return, this has a positive e¤ect on the growth and the overall
nancial environment .
Percentage of Adults Borrowing The percentage of adults borrowing is another mea-
sure of individual nancial usage based on borrowing. The indicator is derived from the
Global Findex survey. Household borrowing tends to be used to nance consumption10, this
type of access can be destabilizing if it leads to over-indebtedness of households.
SMEAccess Constraint The percentage of SMEs identifying access to nance as a major
constraint is an indicator for rm-level nancial access. It is based on SME survey responses
to the World Bank Enterprise Survey question: Is access to nance a signicant constraint
for your rm?Similar to individual nancial access, small rm nancial access can have
positive e¤ects on nancial deepness and generally spur investment and economic growth
with many spillovers to the nancial sector. However, if nancial access leads to an increase
in indebtedness with poor investment choices corresponding to low returns on investment,
access itself may not be stabilizing.
Percentage of Small Firms with Credit Line The percentage of small rms with
a credit line to total small rms is an alternative indicator for small rm nancial access
derived from the WB Enterprise Survey. Similar to the SME access constraint, the specic
usage of the credit line has much to do with whether this type of access has a positive or
negative contribution to nancial stability.
10A study done by Johnston and Morduch (2008) in Indonesia showed that about half the volume of
borrowing by poor households is for non-business purposes, including consumption.
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GDP per capita This indicator is measured in constantprice USD. Higher levels of GDP
per capita indicate greater overall macroeconomic development, which is generally stability
promoting.
GDP growth This indicator (annual % growth rate of GDP at market prices based on
constant 2005 USD) is an indicator of the speed of economic growth. It relates to overall
macro-level nancial stability in a generally positive way but excessively high growth rates
may point to overheating.
GDP growth-Bank Size Interaction Since banks of di¤erent sizes may be a¤ected
di¤erently by GDP growth, an interaction term between the two variables is included.
Interest Rate Spread The interest rate spread is the average lending rate minus average
deposit rate. It is a measure of overall nancial sector protability and we would expect
higher spreads to correspond to reduced likelihoods of distress.
Ination, GDP deator Ination as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP
implicit deator shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole. The GDP
implicit deator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local
currency. Banks in higher-ination countries are subject to greater nominal uncertainty, but
on the other hand this uncertainty can be easily hedged, so it is not clear ex ante the exact
directional impact of this variable11.
Stock Market Volatility This is the Bloomberg volatility of stock price index, 360-day
standard deviation indicator. Lower volatility is generally considered benecial to banking
stability in reducing uncertainty and as a signal of a broadly stable nancial environment.
However, the stock markets in SSA are relatively underdeveloped, with very few listed rms,
thus this measure may not be as important under this backdrop.
Legal Index This is an index of the strength of banking regulation, which should con-
tribute positively to banking stability. It measures the degree to which collateral and bank-
ruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending. The
index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating that these laws are better designed
to expand access to credit.
11Conicting relationships between ination and probability of bank distress were found using di¤erent
measures of distress. The z-score model saw a positive relationship between ination and distress while using
price-book ratio or analyst ratings the result was the opposite. This indicates potentially hedging against
ination with stocks or other unobservable e¤ects.
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HDI The Human Development Index is a composite index measuring average achievement
in three basic dimensions of human development a long and healthy life, knowledge and
a decent standard of living. Including this variable was done in order to control for many
social and structural unobservables that may be adding noise to the relationship between
nancial access and stability.
International Market Access Access to international markets can be a sign of nancial
sector development. Based on the WEO 2012, we identify the following countries in our
sample as having access to international markets: Ghana, Namibia, Senegal, Seychelles,
South Africa and Zambia.
Stock Market Capitalization Total stock market capitalization is the total value of
issued shares of all publicly traded companies in the economy. It is an additional indicator
for nancial sector development.
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